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The U.S. Law Regime of Sovereign 
Immunity and the Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Victorino J. Tejera* 
This article is concerned with the applicability of sovereign 
immunity1 to the so-called sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) 
within the U.S. legal system. While sovereign immunity has existed 
for at least two centuries, SWFs and the types of investment 
activities they conduct on behalf of their parent foreign states are 
a rather recent phenomenon. As a result, the issue of the 
applicability of the rules on sovereign immunity to the SWFs poses 
novel legal challenges and difficulties. In a nutshell, this article is 
intended to answer the following questions: Are SWFs entitled to 
invoke sovereign immunity before U.S. courts? If so, what is the 
U.S. law regime of sovereign immunity applicable to the case of 
the SWFs? 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The last few years have witnessed the emergence and growth of 
certain new modalities of transnational commercial activities by States. 
State-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), the traditional form of State 
involvement in commercial activities, have long played an important role 
in international commerce–whether trading in goods or through foreign 
direct investment (“FDI”).2 To a lesser extent, SOEs have also participated 
in “portfolio investment.”3 
Yet, despite their participation in financial markets by means of 
portfolio investment, the most significant part of SOEs’ international 
investments has traditionally taken the form of FDI. Indeed, the major part 
of their businesses abroad are operational and SOEs get involved in the 
exercise of corporate rights and over management of operations. SWFs, 
on the other hand, a modern type of vehicle for State commercial activities, 
                                                                                                             
2 Broadly speaking, I refer to the notion of FDI to describe the possession of stock and 
involvement in the operations of the relevant corporation. The OECD has defined FDI as:  
a category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a 
lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct 
investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident 
in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct 
investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise. The direct or indirect 
ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise resident 
in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence 
of such a relationship. 
See OECD, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 234 (4th ed. 2008). In the 
same vein, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) has referred to “direct investment” 
as: “a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one economy 
having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that 
is resident in another economy.” See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
and International Investment Position Manual 100 (6th ed. 2009). This publication of the 
IMF refers back to the OECD “Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment.” See 
OECD, supra. 
3 The IMF indicates that, in contrast to direct investors, portfolio investors typically 
have less of a role in the decision making of the enterprise with potentially important 
implications for future flows and for the volatility of the price and volume of positions:  
Portfolio investment differs from other investment in that it provides a 
direct way to access financial markets, and thus it can provide liquidity 
and flexibility. It is associated with financial markets and with their 
specialized service providers, such as exchanges, dealers, and 
regulators. The nature of financial derivatives as instruments through 
which risk is traded in its own right in financial markets sets them apart 
from other types of investment. Whereas other instruments may also 
have risk transfer elements, these other instruments also provide 
financial or other resources. 
See International Monetary Fund, supra note 2 at 99. 
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invest and trade in financial markets and, for the most part, engage in 
“portfolio investment.” This phenomenon of State investment abroad, 
either through SOEs or SWFs, has been referred to as “sovereign 
investment.”4 But, what are SWFs? 
1. A Definition of SWFs 
In simple and very general terms, it may be said that SWFs are State-
owned or governmental investment funds akin to private hedge funds.5 
They are a heterogeneous group of State-controlled entities, with much 
dissimilarity among them. Even though they all pursue financial objectives 
on behalf of their states, they are very diverse in terms of legal structures, 
purposes, sources of funding, activities, investment strategies and ultimate 
goals. Nevertheless, there have been certain attempts to define SWFs as a 
whole. In that connection, a few commentators and entities have put 
forward definitions ranging from the most simple and straight-forward6 to 
more elaborate and detailed ones.7 Perhaps the most widely accepted 
                                                                                                             
4 José Alvarez, Sovereign Concerns and the International Investment Regime, 
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 259, Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
5 The International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (“IWG”), in the 
foreword of the so-called Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP” or 
“Santiago Principles”), refers to SWFs as: “special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements that are owned by the general government.” Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices ‘Santiago Principles,’ 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 3 (October 2008). 
6 Das, Mazarei and Stuart (all IMF officers) refer to the “loosely definition” of SWFs 
as: “government-owned investment funds with investments in foreign financial assets.” 
Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei and Alison Stuart, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the IMF, 
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 515 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2012). Franco Bassanini, for his part, defines SWFs as: “Special investment vehicles 
with long-term horizons, created or owned by a sovereign State.” Franco Bassanini, 
Foreword to Fabio Bassan, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS viii (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc. 2011). A more practical definition of SWFs is that of the European 
Commission, which has stated that SWFs are: “state-owned investment vehicles, which 
typically look to invest the receipts from budget or trade surpluses (e.g. from oil revenues).” 
European Commission, Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/cap
ital/third-countries/sovereign_wealth_funds/index_en.htm (last visited July 11, 2016). 
7 Fabio Bassan, the author of perhaps the only comprehensive book on the law of SWFs 
in existence so far, suggests that they are: “funds established, owned and operated by local 
or central governments which investment strategies include the acquisition of equity 
interest in companies listed in international markets operating in sectors considered 
strategic by their countries of incorporation.” Fabio Bassan, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS 32 (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2011). This definition does not mention 
financial investments other than equity interest. Thus, it appears to be rather incomplete. 
Edwin M. Truman, for his part, refers to SWFs as: “Separate pools of assets, including at 
least some international assets that are owned and managed, directly or indirectly, by a 
government to achieve a mixture of economic, financial, and political objectives.” Edwin 
2016-2017] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY & SWFS 5 
 
definition of SWFs is that formulated in the so-called GAPP or “Santiago 
Principles:”8 
[S]pecial purpose investment funds or arrangements, 
owned by the general government. Created by the general 
government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, 
manage, or administer assets to achieve financial 
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies 
which include investing in foreign financial assets. The 
SWFs are commonly established out of balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, 
the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or 
receipts resulting from commodity exports.9 
This definition points to SWFs’ intrinsic characteristics while, at the 
same time, it refers to other elements such as purposes and objectives, 
source funding and investment strategies. 
2. The GAPP-Santiago Principles 
In April and May 2008, a group of 23 countries with SWFs,10 at a 
meeting in Washington, DC established the IWG and then, under 
coordination of the IMF, endeavored to put together a set of voluntary 
principles or code of good practices of wide acceptance among SWFs, 
aimed at establishing a framework for governance, accountability and 
                                                                                                             
M. Truman, Do the Rules Need to be Changed for State-Controlled Entities? The Case of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 404 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et 
al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2012). Truman highlights that included in that definition 
are all government pension funds except those that merely execute the investment choices 
of individuals, because government pension funds raise many of the same public policy 
issues as non-pension SWFs. Id. The authors Gordon and Niles refer to SWFs as: 
“investment vehicles established by governments to invest a portion of their excess foreign 
exchange reserves in search of higher returns than are typically earned on official reserves.” 
Mark Gordon and Sabastian V. Niles, Sovereign Wealth Funds: an Overview, SOVEREIGN 
INVESTMENT 25 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2012). 
They highlight that SWFs are managed separately from other government assets and SOEs, 
but remain subject to some degree of governmental control or management. Id. 
8 The principles are referred to as the “Santiago Principles” after the capital of Chile 
where the final meeting of the IWG took place and where the principles were adopted in 
2008. 
9 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5, at 27. 
10 The following 23 countries with SWFs comprised the IWG: Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Iran, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, 
Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of 
America. Some of these countries have more than one SWF. However, some of those 
countries with more than one SWF participated in the IWG through one SWF only. 
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transparency for SWFs. The IWG started off by identifying and drafting a 
set of generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflected 
their investment practices and objectives.11 The result of such initiative 
was the conclusion of the 2008 GAPP or Santiago Principles. 
Along with the definition, the GAPP or Santiago Principles’ Appendix 
I makes the caveat that such definition of SWFs excludes foreign currency 
reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of 
payments or monetary policy purposes, operations of SOEs in the 
traditional sense,12 government-employee pension funds, or assets 
managed for the benefit of individuals. Additionally, Appendix I of the 
GAPP refers to three “key elements” as defining SWFs: ownership; 
investments; and purposes and objectives.13 Apart from those elements, 
their sources of funding and their legal structures are quite significant for 
the characterization of SWFs. As will be discussed below, their legal 
structure and whether or not they have separate legal personality have a 
great impact on what rules of sovereign immunity apply to different SWFs. 
3. SWFs’ Activities 
SWFs’ typical activity is the investment of funds in financial markets. 
Being investment funds themselves, in some cases SWFs even invest in 
private hedge funds, just like individuals or corporations do. Until a few 
years ago, it was not common for the State or any of its emanations—
including the few SWFs then in existence—to undertake financial 
investments. While certain SWFs have existed for quite some time (the 
first SWF was established in the early 1950s),14 they had no significant 
investments abroad. Nevertheless, the recent and rapid accumulation of 
multibillionaire foreign assets by some countries has resulted in the 
multiplication in terms of number and size of these sui generis State-
controlled entities and the increase of their investments in global financial 
markets. Moreover, various projections suggest that their presence in 
international capital markets is set to increase further.15 At present, SWFs 
account for about one tenth of the world’s total assets under 
management.16 
                                                                                                             
11 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5, at 1. 
12 It appears like the reference to “SOEs in the traditional sense” is aimed at making a 
distinction with state participation in operative and non-financial business. 
13 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5. 
14 The Kuwait Investment Authority (“KIA”) was set up in 1953 and is the oldest SWF 
in the world. See Kuwait Investment Authority, http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Pages/default
.aspx (last visited July 11, 2016). 
15 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5, at 3. 
16 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance at 15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015. 
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As a result, SWFs have gained an important place as major 
participants in the world international financial markets, making the State 
engage in transactions other than the traditional commercial operations 
that states have ordinarily engaged in for the last 150 years or more. Not 
surprisingly, SWFs have even been characterized as the masters of the new 
global financial order.17 Indeed, according to UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report, by 2014, SWFs had approximately $7 trillion (U.S. 
dollars) in assets under management18 whereas, by the first quarter of 
2016, hedge funds had approximately $2,700 billion (U.S. dollars) in 
assets under management.19 
The role of the SWFs in the world economy became particularly 
salient in light of the 2007-2008 economic crisis,20 where certain SWFs 
from the Middle East and Asia invested multibillionaire amounts of money 
in U.S. and European financial institutions. Some of those headline-
grabbing deals included eleven large, much-needed capital infusions into 
major financial institutions such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, UBS, and 
Morgan Stanley.21 
For example, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (“ADIA”), one of 
the largest SWFs in the world and the largest in the Middle East,22 invested 
$7.5 billion (U.S. dollars) in Citigroup.23 In fact, it has been reported that 
ADIA’s investments in Citibank, along with those of the Kuwaiti and 
Singaporean SWFs, totaled approximately $20 billion (U.S. dollars).24 
Likewise, it was reported that ADIA’s investment in Citibank consisted of 
debt convertible into 4.9% of its common shares, which could have made 
ADIA one of the bank’s largest shareholders.25 
Merrill Lynch raised a total of approximately $10 billion (U.S. 
dollars), initially from Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and later from 
similar wealth funds in the Republic of Korea and Kuwait, amongst 
others.26 One Chinese SWF invested nearly $10 billion (U.S. dollars) in 
                                                                                                             
17 Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Jurisdiction under the FSIA, 11 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 967, 967 (2009). 
18 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 16. 
19 Hedge Fund Industry, BARCLAYHEDGE: ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT DATABASE, 
http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF_Money_Under_Manageme
nt.html (last visited July 11, 2016). 
20 Arina V. Popova, Sovereign Wealth Funds: To Be or Not to Be is Not the Question; 
Which One to Choose Is, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1191, 1192 (2009). 
21 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7, at 25. 
22 SWF INSTITUTE, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, http://www.swfinstitute.org/
swfs/abu-dhabi-investment-authority/ (last visited July 11, 2016). 
23 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7. 
24 Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 977. 
25 Id. 
26 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7, at 44. 
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Morgan Stanley and The Blackstone Group.27 The Swiss giant, UBS, 
received funds from the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
(GIC) and the British bank, Barclays, also received from Singapore’s 
Temasek Holdings. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company, with 
assets over $10 billion (U.S. dollars), ended up being one of the top ten 
investors in General Electric. It paid $800 million (U.S. dollars) for control 
of the Chrysler Building and $2.35 Billion (U.S. dollars) for 7.5% 
ownership in The Carlyle Group.28 Paradoxically, although these activities 
mostly consist of FDI, that is not the major part of SWFs activities. 
SWFs usually invest in foreign financial assets. These funds are in a 
strong position to influence global financial and capital markets, but are 
much less active in FDI. The value of their FDI has been marginal 
compared with the value of assets under management. In 2014, the amount 
of FDI by SWFs reached $16 billion.29 Contrary to the case of SOEs, the 
core of SWFs activities takes the form of portfolio investment abroad. 
Hence, the bulk of SWFs’ funds are held in relatively liquid financial 
assets. 
Of course there are some overlaps between the activities of SOEs and 
SWFs. It would not be accurate to assert that SOEs only engage in FDI 
while SWFs only invest in portfolio investments. Indeed, some SOEs 
engage in portfolio investments as well, while some SWFs may make 
certain investments in FDI. Yet, when SWFs engage in FDI, they do not 
normally get involved in the management or business of the operating 
enterprise and behave as passive investors. Also, when SWFs engage in 
portfolio investments, they do so on a long-term basis. 
As a pattern, SWFs do not seek to obtain controlling stakes in those 
operating companies in the host states where they acquire equity shares. 
And even if they do obtain a controlling stake, they do not avail themselves 
of the possibility of obtaining seats on the boards of directors. 
Furthermore, SWFs are generally employed to preserve or increase the 
country’s national wealth by engaging in passive investments.30 
Conversely, SOEs involvement in FDI oftentimes entails the acquisition 
of controlling stakes, participation in management, and operations. Even 
if SWFs may in certain cases be a vehicle for FDI, they differ from SOEs 
in their mandate. Some SOEs activities are typically public service related, 
                                                                                                             
27 Slawotsky, supra note 17. 
28 Alan M. Rugman, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Regulation: Some Conceptual Issues, 
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 300 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
29 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 16. 
30 Anne-Catherine Hahn, State Immunity and Veil Piercing in the Age of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES ET DU MARCHÉ FINANCIER 103, 104 
(2012) (Switz.). 
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can even be non-profitable in economic terms, and they are normally 
focused on their respective industry.31 Conversely, SWFs activities, by 
definition, are financially speculative. 
According to the GAPP, SWFs must have broadly defined liabilities 
that allow them employ a wide range of investment strategies with a 
medium to long-term timescale.32 Importantly, the GAPP excludes from 
the definition of SWFs those funds that solely invest in domestic assets.33 
That exclusion is certainly important for purposes of the rules on sovereign 
immunity. In fact, if SWFs were to handle domestic investments only, 
those would less likely give rise to legal issues involving foreign elements 
and thus the application of foreign sovereign immunity. 
4. SWFs’ Ownership and Origins 
As the GAPP indicate, SWFs are owned by the general government, 
i.e., by central governments as well as by subnational governments. 
Indeed, certain constituent units of Federal States or other political 
subdivisions, e.g., Alaska (U.S.), Alberta (Canada), Hong Kong (China), 
or Abu Dhabi (U.A.E.) have their own SWFs. On the other hand, their 
ownership may rest in the hands of states eo nomine, their central banks, 
or other monetary authorities. 
But which are those states with SWFs? The Sovereign Wealth 
Institute34 reports, as of the first quarter of 2016, a total of 79 SWFs 
coming from some 56 countries with assets in around $ 7 billion (U.S. 
dollars). Of those states, several possess more than one SWF.35 The 
Appendix presented at the end of this article contains a list of states with 
their respective SWFs. 
                                                                                                             
31 Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, Lisa Sachs and Karl P. Sauvant, Sovereign 
Investment: an Introduction, SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 9, (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et 
al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2012). 
32 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5. 
33 Id. 
34 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute is private entity. It is described on its website as 
a global organization designed to study sovereign wealth funds, public pensions, central 
banks and other long-term public investors in the areas of investing, asset allocation, risk, 
governance, economics, policy, trade and other relevant issues. See The Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute, http://www.swfinstitute.org/about/ (last visited July 11, 2016). It provides 
specialized services such as research and consulting to various corporations, funds and 
governments. Id. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute delivers information and insights 
on current issues and trends related to sovereign wealth. Id. 
35 See The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Tracking the Activity of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, Pensions and other Public Funds, SWFI, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-
rankings/ (last visited April 16, 2016). 
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5. Source of SWFs’ Funding 
Although some SOEs may receive State subsidies, they are typically 
funded through the proceeds of their own activities rather than by State 
foreign reserves.36 In contrast, SWFs consist of currency reserves 
accumulated through foreign trade in commodities or products, which are 
managed separately from the official reserves under the control of central 
banks or monetary authorities. Hence, SWFs’ funds are distinct from the 
official reserves of their states. SWFs may also consist of budgetary 
surpluses resulting from other foreign income.37 Yet, it is estimated that 
about 60% of the total funding of SWFs comes from oil and gas revenues; 
the remaining 40% are more diffuse and include export earnings (mostly 
from raw materials and commodity trade).38 
It is interesting to note that GAAP’s Appendix I highlights that SWFs 
are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official 
foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports. Such 
mention is aimed at reflecting both the traditional background to the 
creation of SWFs—the revenues received from mineral wealth—and the 
more recent approach of transferring ‘excess reserves.’39 
Indeed, SWFs arose, in part, due to the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves by certain high-exporting states. Global trade and 
prevailing high prices of natural resources (mostly oil and gas) allowed a 
number of countries, particularly oil-producing and exporting countries, to 
build up large foreign exchange reserves that far exceed the needs of 
exchange rate management.40 At the same time, some countries with high 
levels of foreign exchange reserves started to use SWFs to hedge currency 
risk and pursue equity-like returns rather than fixed-income returns.41 
A curious and more recent trend, however, is that which has been 
reported of SWFs seeking to diversify their sources of funding by reaching 
out to the private capital market through bond offers, Islamic finance 
devices, or even selling equity participations in subsidiaries.42 This kind 
of activity by SWFs may certainly create conditions for legal disputes 
involving foreign and governmental elements which could, in turn, make 
sovereign immunity play further roles. 
                                                                                                             
36 Schmit Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 31. 
37 Maya Steinitz, Foreign Direct Investment by State-Controlled Entities at Crossroad 
of Economic History: Conference Report of the Rapporteur, SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 535 
(Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2012). 
38 Schmit Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 31, at 4. 
39 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5. 
40 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7, at 29. 
41 Id. at 30. 
42 Schmit Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 31, at 5. 
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6. Purposes 
SWFs generally describe themselves as commercial investors 
pursuing purely financial goals, rather than political objectives.43 Their 
aim is to obtain returns for their investments, higher than those that would 
be provided by standard placement of reserves by the states. As investment 
funds, SWFs operate and invest on the basis of economic and financial 
risk and return-related considerations.44 SWFs are created to serve 
objectives other than, for example, reserve portfolios held only for 
traditional balance of payments purposes. According to the GAPP, it is 
important to demonstrate that SWFs’ investments are made on economic 
and financial basis.45 While SWFs may include reserve assets, the 
intention of the GAPP is not to regard all reserve assets as SWFs.46 
At the same time, however, SWFs’ ultimate purpose differ from case 
to case and some of them may seem somewhat governmental. Indeed, most 
SWFs are established for macroeconomic stabilization purposes; others 
have a mandate to guarantee the future wealth of their nations (e.g. 
Norway’s SWF is mandated to grow in perpetuity) or others may have 
‘fostering regional development’ as their goal.47 Some SWFs may be 
development funds designated to fund socio-economic projects or may 
have a mandate to promote gentler economic cycles providing reserves for 
difficult times.48 
The authors Das, Mazarei and Stuart offer a helpful classification of 
five types of SWFs according to their dominant objectives: (1) 
stabilization funds, where the primary objective is to insulate the budget 
and the economy against commodity (usually oil) price volatility; (2) 
savings future funds for future generations, which aim to convert non-
renewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of assets and mitigate 
the effects of the Dutch disease;49 (3) reserve investment corporations, 
                                                                                                             
43 Int’l Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, IFSWF Members’ Experiences in the 
Application of the Santiago Principles at 30–31 (IFSWF 2011). 
44 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5, at 5. 
45 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5, at 4. In particular, GAPP 
Principle 19 states that: “The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-
adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on 
economic and financial grounds.” 
46 Id. at 27. 
47 Schmit Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 31. 
48 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7. 
49 Dutch disease is the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a 
sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The currency 
inflows lead to currency appreciation, making the country’s other products less price 
competitive on the export market. It also leads to higher levels of cheap imports and can 
lead to deindustrialization as industries apart from resource exploitation are moved to 
cheaper locations. The origin of the phrase is the Dutch economic crisis of the 1960s 
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whose assets are often still counted as reserve assets, and are established 
to increase the return on reserves; (4) development funds, which typically 
help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that 
might raise a country’s potential output growth; and (5) contingent pension 
reserve funds, which provide (from sources other than individual pension 
contributors) for contingent, unspecified pension liabilities on the 
government’s balance sheet.50 
This classification is somewhat in line with the indication by the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds that SWFs may 
comprise fiscal stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment 
corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds without 
explicit pension liabilities.51 
7. Concerns 
The participation of other sovereigns (through SWFs and SOEs) 
investing in their territories and economies has brought about certain 
concerns and policy reactions by some states including the U.S.  Those 
reactions and concerns have focused on issues of national security;52 SWFs 
lack of transparency;53 fears that foreign states—as controlling authorities 
of SWFs—invest in companies with a view to acquiring intellectual 
property; “know-how” in military items and technologies; or to research, 
produce and trade in weapons.54 Perhaps because of the magnitude of their 
                                                                                                             
following the discovery of North Sea natural gas. See Sophia Grene, Definition of Dutch 
disease, FINANCIAL TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=dutch-disease (last visited 
July 11, 2016). When a country discovers tradeable natural resources, such as oil, it 
normally experiences real appreciation of its exchange rate and thus a crowding out of its 
other tradeable sectors. This phenomenon first drew attention in the case of the 
Netherlands, where natural gas discoveries clearly hurt the competitiveness of Dutch 
manufacturing. See Paul Krugman, The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the 
Competitive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic 
Scale Economies, 27 J. DEV. ECON. 41, 49 (1987). 
50 Das, Mazarei & Stuart, supra note 6, at 516. 
51 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 5. 
52 Mark Clodefelter and Francesca Guerrero, National Security and Foreign 
Government Ownership Restrictions on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at 
the National Level, SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 173 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Alvarez, supra note 4, at 258-282; Patrick DeSouza and 
W. Michael Reisman, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security, SOVEREIGN 
INVESTMENT 283 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
53 Simone Mezzacapo, The so-called ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’: regulatory issues, 
financial stability and prudential supervision, EUROPEAN COMMISSION ECONOMIC PAPERS 
378 (2009). 
54 Julien Chaisse, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the European Union: 
Can the Supranational Level Limit the Rise of National Protectionism, SOVEREIGN 
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investments and the fact that they, in the end, are governmentally-owned 
entities, SWFs have attracted considerable attention. Particularly, 
investments by Persian Gulf and East Asian SWFs, in 2007 and 2008, in 
U.S. and European financial institutions following the economic crisis of 
those years, caused a general awareness about sovereign investment. 
Probably the most prevalent fears relate to the issue that such 
investments may have detrimental impacts on host countries’ national 
security. In addition, sovereign investment in strategic industries has 
raised other concerns about the foreign access to sensitive technology or 
foreign control over natural resources, key industrial complexes, or critical 
infrastructure.55 Thus, because their investment motivations have been a 
source of distrust, it is not uncommon to hear allegations of political 
objectives behind the investments of SWFs. Interestingly, however, most 
concerns and policy reactions relate to sovereign foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is not the core activity of the majority of SWFs. 
An example of a national security concern was the Dubai Ports (DP) 
World deal in 2006, which consisted of the sale of some ports in the U.S. 
to DP World from the U.A.E. In the end, public concern in the U.S. forced 
DP World to divest, even though they had obtained the approval of the 
U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS).56 Because some voices 
raised concerns about this deal in Congress, the President of the U.S. was 
forced to reopen the process by which DP World had been allowed to 
proceed with the deal.57 In light of those pressures, DP World 
“voluntarily” withdrew from this deal. 
8. Regulation 
Regulation of FDI in general, and concerning SOEs, in particular, is 
abundant and is not a new phenomenon. Less common, however, is 
regulation concerning SWFs’ investments. Nonetheless, the 
abovementioned concerns have made several governments regulate 
SWFs’ investments. Yet, such regulation has focused for the most part on 
national security issues, foreign government ownership restrictions, 
market access for SWFs, or on protectionist restrictions. 
In addition to legislation, there are certain soft-law instruments 
touching upon sovereign investment. In fact, in 2008, in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis, some European institutions, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International 
                                                                                                             
INVESTMENT 462, 470 (Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al. eds., Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
55 Schmit Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 31, at 11-12. 
56 Steinitz, supra note 37, at 537. 
57 For more details on this deal see Rugman, supra note 28, at 299. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) endeavored to create guidelines, policies, or codes 
of good practices aimed at dealing with the concerns raised about SWFs. 
In February 2008, for example, the European Commission presented a 
communication to the European Parliament, Council, European Economic 
and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions proposing a 
common E.U. approach to SWFs. The European Commission claims that 
it was in response to that communication that the Santiago Principles were 
agreed upon.58 
The OECD, on the other hand, at a Ministerial Council Meeting in 
Paris, adopted the OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Recipient Country Policies on June 5, 2008.59  Later that year, in October 
2008, the OECD issued the OECD Guidance on Sovereign Wealth Funds60 
dealing with SWFs’ investments in OECD economies. Almost in parallel, 
the Santiago Principles were agreed upon. 
Nevertheless, no specific legislation or soft-law instrument has dealt 
with issues of sovereign immunity in relation to SWFs’ investments. 
Indeed, neither the E.U. normative nor the OECD Declaration on SWFs 
and Recipient Country Policies or its Guidance on SWFs deal with issues 
of sovereign immunity. The GAPP only incidentally (in a footnote),61 
indicate that recipient countries may grant to SWFs certain privileges, such 
as sovereign immunity and sovereign tax treatment, based on their 
governmental status. In other words, the GAPP do not contemplate 
sovereign immunity in the context of judicial proceedings involving SWFs 
or their property—they do only in relation to regulatory issues. 
Because there are no specific rules of sovereign immunity regulating 
the case of the SWFs, as will be discussed in the next pages, in order to 
address the U.S. law regime of sovereign immunity applicable to the 
SWFs, it will be necessary to rely on the general rules and case law 
concerning traditional State entities. 
9. Types of SWFs by Legal Structure 
Pursuant to the IWG’s explanation and commentary to the GAPP, 
depending on their legal structures, SWFs could be of three types. The first 
                                                                                                             
58 European Commission, supra note 6. 
59 OECD, OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country 
Policies, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecddeclarationonsovereignweal
thfundsandrecipientcountrypolicies.htm (last visited July 11, 2016). 
60 See OECD, OECD GUIDANCE ON SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, http://www.oecd.org
/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecdguidanceonsovereignwealthfunds.htm (last visited July 
11, 2016). 
61 Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices ‘Santiago Principles,’ SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 22 n. 35 (IWF-SWF 2008) 
(explaining and commenting on GAPP 20 Principle). 
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type refers to those SWFs established as “separate legal identities” under 
public law, with full capacity to act. They are normally governed by a 
specific constitutive legislation.62 It may be added that these SWFs 
typically have separate legal personalities from the State even though they 
are not SOEs. The second type of SWFs identified by the IWG take the 
form of SOEs. As such, they are typically governed by corporate law 
although other specific laws may also apply.63 Lastly, the third type 
consists of “pools of assets” without separate legal personalities from the 
states, which are normally owned by them or by their central banks. In 
most cases, specific legislation govern these SWFs.64 In reality, for 
purposes of this article, SWFs may be categorized in two broader groups: 
SWFs with separate legal personalities and SWFs without separate legal 
personalities from the State. 
II. SWFS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE U.S. LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
Because SWFs are State-controlled entities, their financial activities65 
and assets in U.S. territory may imply a role for the sovereign immunity 
of their foreign states under U.S. law. As was indicated by one 
commentator, the ever-increasing globalization and the concurrent 
explosion in the number and variety of entities such as SWFs, with 
significant ties to foreign sovereigns, will only increase litigation. For 
example, one issue is whether they qualify as “organs” for purposes of the 
FSIA.66 Private parties in the U.S. may want to bring claims against SWFs 
before U.S. courts and sovereign immunity may make it difficult for those 
private parties to pursue their legitimate claims.67 Because of their specific 
nature as State investment vehicles, claimants may be confronted with 
SWFs relying on State immunities.68 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. at 11. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 I refer interchangeably to both commercial and financial activities of SWFs as a 
generic way to describe their activities. However, strictly speaking, those financial 
activities are a sub-type of commercial activities. 
66 Michael A. Granne, Defining ‘Organ of a Foreign State’ Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2008). The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §1602, (1976), will be discussed below. 
67 David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled 
Investors 5 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2010/02, 2010). 
68 Bart De Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role 
of the State, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 779, 812 (2009). 
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At the same time, not only can SWFs’ dealings with third parties give 
rise to litigation, but creditors of parent states can also try to execute their 
judgments or awards targeting the assets that compose or belong to their 
SWFs. Indeed, SWFs may, due to the significant wealth held by them and 
the international scope of their activities, be attracting the attention of 
creditors trying to enforce claims against the states controlling them.69 At 
that point, issues of sovereign immunity will in all likelihood arise. 
For example, as one commentator argued, where involved in 
litigation, SWFs would undoubtedly claim immunity under U.S. law, as 
“agencies or instrumentalities” of the foreign government.70 These issues 
are certainly not the only aspects of sovereign immunity that could arise 
in connection to SWFs. Also, because SWFs are State-controlled entities, 
judges may have to apply sovereign immunity rules sua sponte. 
At the same time, State immunity may turn out to be a double-edged 
sword for SWFs themselves or their states. If they can successfully raise 
immunity defenses, their partners in subsequent transactions will most 
likely insist on comprehensive waivers or perhaps even require that certain 
commercial properties be set aside in view of potential execution 
measures.71 
Therefore, it would not be surprising that SWFs’ activities in the U.S. 
become, in the near future, a common cause or reason for litigation and 
for the consequent invocation or application of sovereign immunity. 
Globalization and the explosion in number and variety of SWFs will 
certainly increase litigation dealing with immunity issues.72 Moreover, in 
the wake of the 2007-2008 economic crisis, various SWFs invested in 
financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe. That circumstance alone 
could eventually get those SWFs into transnational litigation where 
sovereign immunity will certainly play a role. 
Nevertheless, the application of sovereign immunity to the SWFs 
poses certain difficulties resulting out of the tension between their dual 
                                                                                                             
69 Anne-Catherine Hahn, State Immunity and Veil Piercing in the Age of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES ET DU MARCHÉ FINANCIER 103, 105 
(2012) (Switz.). 
70 Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 995. Although in the context of the SEC assessing 
violations of U.S. laws, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox noted that, in his view: “Neither 
international law nor the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act renders [SWFs] immune from 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in connection with their commercial activity conducted in 
the United States.” Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exch. Comm’n, 
Keynote Address and Robert R. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Role of Government in 
Markets (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007
/spch102407cc.htm). 
71 Hahn, supra note 69, at 118. 
72 Granne, supra note 66, at 3-4. 
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status as investors in financial markets and State-controlled entities. Yet, 
there are no specific sovereign immunity rules that address cases involving 
SWFs and sovereign immunity. Moreover, even though U.S. case law 
dealing with State immunity in connection to the State or State entities is 
abundant, U.S. case law dealing with SWFs and sovereign immunity is 
still very scarce and has only addressed isolated aspects. Scholarship on 
the topic is also limited.73 Thus, the question whether—and to what 
extent—SWFs are entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in the U.S. is a 
very important one.74 Hence, the need to analyze how the U.S. legal regime 
of sovereign immunity would address situations involving SWFs. 
1. The Regime of Sovereign Immunity from Jurisdiction 
Under the FSIA 
The regime of sovereign immunity under U.S. law is basically what is 
provided for under the FSIA. The 1976 enactment of the FSIA constituted 
a crucial contribution of U.S. law to the development of international law 
on State immunity. The FSIA provides the statutory system governing 
issues of sovereign immunity in the U.S. in connection to suits against 
foreign states.75 That piece of legislation endorsed, codified, and 
                                                                                                             
73 Only a few commentators have referred to the problems posed without going into too 
much detail. For example, Bart De Meester suggests that the property of SWFs could 
qualify as commercial property without providing further explanation. Bart De Meester, 
supra note 68, at 815. Daniel Etlinger advocates for an amendment to the FSIA. However, 
the content of such proposed amendment is not the core of his research and is limited to 
suggest an amendment “for an investor to recover anything he or she would need to traverse 
through the [FSIA].” Daniel Etlinger, Sovereign Wealth Fund Liability: Private Investors 
Left Out in the Cold, 18 U. MIAMI BUS L. REV. 59, 90 (2010). Professor Anne van Aaken 
conducted a thorough law and economics analysis of modern State commercial activities 
vis-à-vis state immunity from execution. She concluded: “[F]rom an economic perspective, 
SWFs and SOEs with the purpose of return on assets for the general account of the state 
should not be immune—neither in jurisdiction nor the assets from execution.” Anne van 
Aaken, Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities. A 
Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution 44, (Univ. of St. 
Gallen L. Sch., L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2013-17, 2013). 
Two other commentators in the U.S. have touched upon issues of sovereign immunity 
related to SWFs although both papers have focused on more general issues, only touching 
upon the SWFs in an incidental way. See Slawotsky, supra note 70; Granne, supra note 66 
at 1. 
74 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 971; Granne, supra note 66, at 3. 
75 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 (2010) (“we do not think that the [FSIA] 
codified the common law with respect to the immunity of individual officials.”). The 
Supreme Court also stated,  
we think this case  . . . is properly governed by the common law 
because it is not a claim against a foreign state as the [FSIA] defines 
that term. Although Congress clearly intended to supersede the 
common-law regime for claims against foreign states, we find nothing 
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implemented the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity:76 It affords 
foreign states immunity for their ‘sovereign’ acts and denies them 
immunity for their “commercial” or “private” acts.77 In the words of Chief 
Justice Roberts in the recent decision of OBB Personenverkehr AG v. 
Sachs, “[t]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act shields foreign states and 
their agencies from suit in United States courts unless the suit falls within 
one of the Act’s specifically enumerated exceptions.”78 
As a matter of U.S. law, the FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.79 Thus, a foreign State will benefit from a grant of 
immunity from jurisdiction, subject to the exceptions specified in § 1605 
and § 1605(A) of the FSIA. The exceptions to such grant of immunity 
include: (1) cases in which the foreign State has waived its immunity; (2) 
actions that arise out of the foreign sovereign’s commercial activities that 
either are conducted in, or cause a direct effect in the U.S.; (3) cases in 
which rights in property taken in violation of international law are at issue; 
(4) actions concerning rights in real estate and inherited gift property 
located in the U.S.; (5) cases concerning certain noncommercial torts 
allegedly committed within the U.S.; (6) cases in which a foreign State has 
agreed to arbitrate and the arbitration agreement is or may be governed by 
a treaty signed by the U.S. calling for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards; and (7) actions for personal injury or death arising out of, 
among other things, acts of aircraft sabotage, provided that the defendant 
nation has been designated a State sponsor of terrorism.80 Section 1607 of 
the FSIA also contemplates an exception to the general rule of immunity 
from jurisdiction for cases of counterclaims. 
Section 1602 of the FSIA sets out the premises of the regime of State 
immunity provided for under such statute. That section of the FSIA 
indicates that, under international law, states are not immune from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are 
concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the 
satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their 
commercial activities. In the words of the Justice Souter, the FSIA 
                                                                                                             
in the statute’s origin or aims to indicate that Congress similarly 
wanted to codify the law of foreign official immunity. 
Id. at 325. 
76 Id. at 313. 
77 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 234 (5th ed. 2007) (quoting Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 
U.S. 480 (1983)). 
78 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ____, 1 (2015). 
79 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 77, at 72. 
80 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a)(1)-(7)(2008)(section 7 repealed 2008); see Mezerhane v. the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, et al., No.: 11-23983-CIV-Cooke/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 30, 2013) (order dismissing case). 
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embraces the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which provides 
that: “a state is immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its 
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii), but not as to those that are private 
or commercial in character (jure gestionis).”81 In consequence, there will 
be immunity from jurisdiction where the relevant State activity can be 
categorized as iure imperi and, conversely, there will not be immunity 
where the activity is considered iure gestionis. 
At the same time, the property of a foreign State will be immune from 
arrest, attachment or execution, subject to the exceptions contemplated 
under § 1610 of the FSIA. Lastly, from a procedural point of view, it is 
interesting to note the comments of one of the most renowned scholars in 
the field, Lady Hazel Fox, who argues that under the FSIA regime, 
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be specially 
pleaded.82 Fox states that unlike the U.K. regime, there is no statutory 
requirement in the FSIA carried over from the common law that the court 
itself is under a duty to address the issue of immunity.83 However, there 
have been cases where U.S. courts have raised the issue of sovereign 
immunity sua sponte.84 
A. SWFs and Sovereign Immunity from Jurisdiction in the 
U.S. Based on “Status” 
Even though all SWFs are State entities, not all of them may be 
entitled to immunity in the U.S. Certain legal structures may be afforded 
immunity from jurisdiction while others may not.85 Depending on the legal 
form it adopts, a SWF may be considered as part of the State proper, as an 
“agency or instrumentality” or as a SOE not protected by immunity. At the 
same time, based on the status of a SWF as: 1) a pool of assets without 
separate legal personality held by the State or a central bank; 2) an entity 
with separate legal personality from the State qualifying as “agency or 
instrumentality;” or 3) an entity with separate legal personality not 
qualifying as “agency” or “instrumentality” of the State, the rules on 
immunity from jurisdiction will apply differently and the relevant SWF 
will be covered by immunity from jurisdiction or not. 
                                                                                                             
81 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1993). 
82 HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 240 (3d ed. 2013). 
83 Id. 
84 See e.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp.2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2010). 
85 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 97. Slawotsky asserts that the legal structure of a SWF 
(a sovereign owning shares in a SWF with separate corporate personality versus the SWF 
being an organ of the sovereign) may determine the grant of immunity from jurisdiction. 
However, Slawotsky also argues that the purpose of a SWF will influence whether a U.S. 
Court grants immunity or not. Id. at 972 n. 28. 
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For example, if a SWF is just a fund without separate legal personality 
administered by a ministry of finance, the immunity rules applicable to the 
State proper would play a role. Conversely, if a SWF has separate legal 
personality, it may, under certain circumstances, be considered as an 
“agency” or “instrumentality.” Accordingly, the immunity rules 
applicable to agencies or instrumentalities will apply. As a result, each 
SWF will be subject to the U.S. rules of sovereign immunity applicable to 
the relevant State entity. At the same time, they will be subject to the 
appropriate exceptions to such rules. 
On the other hand, depending on their status as pool-of-assets-SWFs 
managed by a ministry of finance or pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a 
central bank, U.S. law on State immunity from execution regarding foreign 
states or the rules regarding foreign central banks or other monetary 
authorities would apply. As for SWFs with separate legal personalities that 
qualify for a status as “agencies or instrumentalities,” U.S. law rules on 
State immunity from execution regarding those type of entities will apply. 
Therefore, this article explores the U.S. legal regime of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdictions applicable to: (1) SWFs that are pools of 
assets without separate legal personalities that are held by the State or by 
a central bank; and (2) SWFs with separate legal personalities from the 
State qualifying as “agencies or instrumentalities.” At the same time, the 
analysis of SWFs with separate legal personalities from the State 
qualifying as “agencies or instrumentalities” will tacitly lead to the 
analysis of the case of SWFs with separate legal personalities not 
qualifying as “agencies or instrumentalities” of the State vis-à-vis the U.S. 
legal regime of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. 
B. Pool-of-Assets-SWFs and U.S. Law on Sovereign 
Immunity from Jurisdiction 
Under the FSIA classification based on “status,” those SWFs that are 
asset pools will, unless an exception applies, be immune from jurisdiction. 
SWFs that are pools of assets may be managed by ministries of finance or 
may be managed by central banks or monetary authorities, usually with 
separate legal personality. Each case has its own particularities. The two 
following subsections deal with the case of: (a) pool-of-assets-SWFs 
managed by ministries; and (b) pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by central 
banks. 
a. Pool-of-Assets-SWFs Managed by a Ministry and 
Immunity from Jurisdiction 
Under the FSIA regime, a SWF that is a pool of assets without separate 
legal personality which is managed by a ministry of finance will, in all 
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likelihood, be analyzed under the regime of sovereign immunity 
applicable to the State proper.86 Indeed, strictly speaking, the sovereign 
immunity rules would not apply to the SWF as such but to the State, 
precisely because the fund and the ministry do not have separate legal 
personality from the State. The fund is just a pool of assets that is invested 
by the ministry which, in turn, is a division of the State and is just a part 
of it. In simple terms, in this type of situation, it is the State that invests its 
own assets. Importantly, by virtue of § 1603(a) of the FSIA, the definition 
of “State” includes political subdivisions of foreign states, without any 
additional requirement. Thus, the case of SWFs that are pool of assets 
without separate legal personality that are managed by political 
subdivisions of foreign states will be akin to the case of those pool-of-
assets-SWFs that are managed by the State proper.87 
Pursuant to § 1604 of the FSIA, foreign states are entitled to a 
presumptive grant of immunity from suit.88 That is, as a general rule, a 
foreign State shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
U.S. Then, FSIA Sections 1605, 1605A and 1607 provide for the 
exceptions to such general rule. The most relevant exception, for purposes 
of this article, is the “commercial activity” exception provided for under 
FSIA § 1605(a)(2). Hence, a State managing a SWF will enjoy its standard 
immunity from jurisdiction while it could also be subject to the 
“commercial activity” exception. 
The “commercial activity” exception under FSIA § 1605(a)(2) has 
been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court as the single most important 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity in the U.S.89 The three prongs of 
FSIA § 1605(a)(2) provide for exceptions to sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction where the action is based upon: (1) a “commercial activity” 
carried on in the U.S. by the foreign State; or (2) an act performed in the 
U.S. in connection with a “commercial activity” of the foreign State 
elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection with 
a “commercial activity” of the foreign State elsewhere that causes a direct 
                                                                                                             
86 There are various definitions of “State” in international law. The Third Restatement, 
indicates that “the ‘state’ is an entity which has a defined territory and permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and which engages in, or has the 
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §201 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
87 For this reason, any reference in this thesis to the State proper in the context of the 
FSIA regime of sovereign immunity must be understood as including political subdivisions 
of foreign states. 
88 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 250 (5th ed. 2007). 
89 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992); see also BORN & 
RUTLEDGE, supra note 88, at 277, 280. 
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effect in the U.S. Thus, either the commercial activity has a jurisdictional 
nexus with the U.S. or it causes a direct effect in the U.S. 
Section 1603 of the FSIA contains certain definitions that are useful 
to understand § 1605 and the relevant exceptions. In that connection, 
§ 1603(d) indicates that: “‘commercial activity’ means either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act.” At the same time, that provision clarifies that the commercial 
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the “nature” of 
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its “purpose.” In other words, this provision favors the 
“nature” test over the “purpose” test. In many instances in practice, it may 
be difficult to separate the “nature” from the “purpose” of an activity so as 
to apply this nature/purpose test. That is why such a test has not been free 
from criticism. As indicated by the International Court of Justice Judge 
James Crawford, the notion that human activity can be classified, or even 
described, without referring to the purpose is a delusion.90 
In De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,91 the Fifth Circuit 
highlighted such difficulties in separating the “nature” from the “purpose” 
of an activity. The De Sanchez court stated that “[o]ften, the essence of an 
act is defined by its purpose” and unless “we can inquire into the purposes 
of such acts, we cannot determine their nature.”92 In Republic of Argentina 
et al. v. Weltover, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged how 
“difficult it may be in some cases to separate ‘purpose’ (i.e., the reason 
why the foreign state engages in the activity) from the ‘nature’ (i.e., the 
outward form of the conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to 
perform).”93 However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the De Sanchez 
approach and established that the FSIA language forecloses the argument 
that the distinction between “nature” and “purpose” is neither useful nor 
warranted. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the FSIA unmistakably 
commands to separate “nature” from “purpose.”94 
Commentator Joel Slawotsky, in his 2008 article on SWFs and 
jurisdiction under the FSIA, argued in favor of the De Sanchez reasoning 
as follows: 
While courts will evaluate the question of the activity by 
reference to its nature rather than its purpose, SWFs will 
likely argue that the SWFs’ activity is inextricably linked 
                                                                                                             
90 James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune 
Transactions, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L LAW 75, 95 (1983). 
91 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (1985). 
92 Id. at 1393. 
93 Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618. 
94 Id. 
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with basic essential public functions, and therefore, the 
nature of their activity is the same as the purpose—a 
sovereign governmental function. The very nature of the 
SWF investments may correlate with intrinsically public 
functions, such as adjusting or modifying core economic 
responsibilities of the sovereign. To the extent 
transparency and accountability are practiced, these may 
be useful in evaluating whether the nature of the SWFs’ 
conduct really reflects a basic governmental duty to its 
citizens.95 
As may be observed, Slawotsky somehow mingles the “purposes” 
with the “nature” of an act. As a result, this commentator suggests that a 
SWF conducting stabilization, savings, reserve investment or 
development activities cannot be stripped of sovereign immunity on the 
basis of the “commercial activity” exception.96 That approach appears 
unjustified. On one hand, as indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Weltover, the FSIA clearly commands that the commercial character of an 
activity shall be determined by reference to the ‘nature’ of the course of 
conduct, rather than by reference to its ‘purpose.’97 Although, as 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, it may be difficult in some cases 
to separate “purpose” from “nature,” this formula must be applied even as 
a fiction where the “nature” of the act is analyzed in isolation of any 
external factor. Such fiction or isolation may be achieved through an 
exercise of “individuation.” The method of “individuation,” which will be 
analyzed in more detail below in the section corresponding to the “organ” 
prong in § 1603(b)(2) of the FSIA, may be very useful in isolating specific 
SWFs’ activities, prior to their “commerciality” or “non-commerciality” 
assessment. 
On the other hand, although SWFs will likely argue that the “nature” 
of their activities is the same as the “purpose” (a sovereign governmental 
function), that is an untenable generalization and each case involving a 
SWF would need to be analyzed individually. It is true that an inquiry into 
the “purpose” is often inevitable when looking for the “nature” of an 
activity. However, it is likely that in most SWF cases of “commercial 
activity exceptions” to immunity, the relevant activity’s “nature” may be 
determined through a narrow analysis, which does not involve any inquiry 
into the ultimate purposes of the SWF. Additionally, a SWF financial 
activity may certainly have a sovereign “purpose” and yet, its “nature” will 
most likely be that of just a “financial activity.” In terms of 
                                                                                                             
95 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 1000 (footnotes omitted). 
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97 28 U.S.C. §1603(d)(2006). 
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“individuation,” the commercial or non-commercial character may be 
determined by isolating the relevant activity. 
The legislative history of the FSIA is useful in understanding the scope 
of this provision.  The House Report indicated: 
[S]ection 1603 defines the term ‘commercial activity’ as 
including a broad spectrum of endeavor, from an 
individual commercial transaction or act to a regular 
course of commercial conduct. A ‘regular course of 
commercial conduct’ includes the carrying on of a 
commercial enterprise such as a mineral extraction 
company, an airline or a state trading corporation. 
Certainly, if the activity is carried out for profit, its 
commercial nature could readily be assumed. At the other 
end of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the same 
character as a contract which might be made by a private 
person, could constitute a ‘particular transaction or act.’ 
As the definition indicates, the fact that goods or services 
to be procured through a contract are to be used for a 
public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially 
commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is 
critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy 
provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to 
construct a government building constitutes a commercial 
activity.98 
The leading U.S. decision dealing with the concept of “commercial 
activity” for purposes of the FSIA was rendered in 1992 in the case of the 
Republic of Argentina et al. v. Weltover, Inc., where the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that such FSIA definition of “commercial activity” 
leaves the critical term “commercial” largely undefined.99 In that case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the issuance of 
bonds by the government of Argentina was a “commercial activity” as 
opposed to a “sovereign activity” for purposes of immunity from 
jurisdiction. In that connection, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: 
[W]e conclude that when a foreign government acts, not 
as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private 
player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are 
                                                                                                             
98 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614-
6615. 
99 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992). 
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‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA. Moreover, 
because the [FSIA] provides that the commercial 
character of an act is to be determined by reference to its 
‘nature’ rather than its ‘purpose’, 28 USC § 1603(d), the 
question is not whether the foreign government is acting 
with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling 
uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is 
whether the particular actions that the foreign state 
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type 
of actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade and 
traffic or commerce.’ Thus, a foreign government’s 
issuance of regulations limiting foreign currency 
exchange is a sovereign activity, because such 
authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by 
a private party; whereas a contract to buy army boots or 
even bullets is a ‘commercial’ activity, because private 
companies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire 
goods . . . . 
The commercial character of the Bonods is confirmed by 
the fact that they are in almost all respects garden-variety 
debt instruments: they may be held by private parties; they 
are negotiable and may be traded on the international 
market (except in Argentina); and they promise a future 
stream of cash income. 
 . . .  
Because the FSIA has now clearly established that the 
‘nature’ governs, we perceive no basis for concluding that 
the issuance of debt should be treated as categorically 
different from other activities of foreign states.100 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled: “[I]t is irrelevant why Argentina 
participated in the bond market in the manner of a private actor; it matters 
only that it did so. We conclude that Argentina’s issuance of the Bonods 
was a ‘commercial activity’ under the FSIA.”101 
Another important part of § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA that was dealt with 
by the U.S. Supreme Court shortly after Weltover is the phrase ‘based 
upon.’102 In fact, § 1605(a)(2) lifts immunity only from suits that are 
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102 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993). 
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“based upon” a commercial activity or that are “based upon” an act in 
connection with a commercial activity.103 In the case of Nelson, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Although the [FSIA] contains no definition of the phrase 
‘based upon’, and the relatively sparse legislative history 
offers no assistance, guidance is hardly necessary. In 
denoting conduct that forms the ‘basis’, or ‘foundation’, 
for a claim  . . .  the phrase is read most naturally to mean 
those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a 
plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case.104 
More recently, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated, “Nelson . . . teaches that an action is ‘based upon’ 
the ‘particular conduct’ that constitutes the ‘gravamen’ of the suit.”105 
In light of the above, three possible “commercial activities” scenarios 
could involve a SWF that is a pool of assets managed by a ministry. First, 
the funds will not be immune where an action by a claimant is based upon 
a commercial activity carried on in the U.S. Likewise, immunity from 
jurisdiction should not bar a claim against the State and involving its SWF 
if such claim is based upon an act performed in the U.S. in connection with 
a commercial activity elsewhere. Finally, even if a claim against the State 
and involving its pool-of-assets-SWF is based upon an act outside the 
territory of the U.S. and in connection with a commercial activity that also 
occurred outside of the U.S., the State’s immunity from jurisdiction would 
not be an obstacle to pursue such claim before the U.S. courts as long as 
such activity causes a direct effect in U.S. territory. 
In the case of the first prong of FSIA § 1605(a)(2), if the activities 
undertaken by the respective ministry of finances in the U.S. with the 
assets that compose the pool-of-assets-SWF are, pursuant to the “nature” 
test, considered “commercial,” the U.S. courts will have jurisdiction to 
hear claims based upon such activities. This could be, for example, a case 
where a foreign ministry of finances buys securities in the New York Stock 
Exchange with funds composing a pool-of-assets-SWF. In fact, in 
Weltover, the U.S. Supreme Court characterized the issuance of debt by a 
foreign State as a “commercial activity” pursuant to the “nature” test.106 
Accordingly, if bond issuance is a “commercial activity” despite the fact 
that through the issuance of those instruments the State assumes debt, i.e., 
                                                                                                             
103 GARY B. BORN AND PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 288 (5th ed. 2007). 
104 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). 
105 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ____, 7 (2015). 
106 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615-17 (1992). 
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it engages in legal obligations, pursuant to the “nature” test, State 
investment in securities should be readily classified as a “commercial 
activity” as well. 
Lady Hazel Fox argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in Weltover 
adopted the Harvard Research in International Law’s approach, which 
recommended defining commercial activity when a foreign State engages 
in industrial, commercial, financial or other business enterprise.107 In this 
connection, Article 11 of the Harvard Research in International Law draft 
Convention on the “Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States” 
provided as follows: 
A State may be made a respondent in a proceeding in a 
court of another State when, in the territory of such other 
State, it engages in an industrial, commercial, financial or 
other business enterprise in which private persons may 
there engage, or does an act there in connection with such 
an enterprise wherever conducted, and the proceeding is 
based upon the conduct of such enterprise or upon such 
act. 
The foregoing provision shall not be construed to allow a 
State to be made a respondent in a proceeding relating to 
its public debt.108 
Lady Fox’s observation is interesting. While the first paragraph of 
Article 11 certainly indicates that a foreign State may be made a 
respondent when it engages in a financial business, the second paragraph 
clearly indicates that the provision in the first paragraph shall not be 
construed to allow a State to be made a respondent in a proceeding relating 
to its public debt. The fact is that Weltover was a case precisely dealing 
with public debt. Indeed, the issuance of bonds by a State (Argentina in 
that case) is the kind of activity that may be encompassed in the category 
of public debt. Thus, it seems like the reference to the Harvard Draft was 
not so adequate for a case of bonds issuance. However, Article 11 is 
particularly relevant for a case of sovereign investment, i.e., the typical 
activity of a SWF. While the second paragraph of Article 11 excluded 
pubic debt from the category of State activities that could be considered 
iure gestionis, the first paragraph expressly contemplated the possibility 
that states engage in other financial activities. In an implicit way, Article 
                                                                                                             
107 HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB: THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 261 (3d ed. 2013). 
108 Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign 
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11’s first paragraph recognized that those other State financial activities 
may be considered iure gestionis. 
In any case, § 1603(e) of the FSIA is intended to clarify the meaning 
of the first prong of § 1605(a)(2). Section 1603(e) provides, “A 
‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state’ 
means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial 
contact with the United States.” Yet, in Triple A v. Congo, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered that “[t]he term ‘commercial 
activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the 
United States[,]’ as used in § 1603(e), is far from clear. The definition only 
confuses the statute’s meaning.”109 The same Court observed that the first 
clause of § 1605(a)(2) comprises cases where the foreign State’s 
commercial activity occurs in the U.S.110 The FSIA legislative history 
explains that: “[t]his definition includes cases based on commercial 
transactions performed in whole or in part in the [U.S.].”111 
In the case of the second prong of § 1605(a)(2), if the ministry of 
finances, i.e., the foreign State engages in one such commercial activity 
even outside the territory of the U.S. and yet it performs an act in the U.S. 
in connection with such activity, the U.S. courts will have jurisdiction to 
hear claims based upon such act. Albeit succinctly, the Nelson case also 
referred to the phrase “in connection with” and indicated that a reasonable 
reading calls for “something more than a mere connection.”112 
For example, if the foreign State invests the funds of the SWF through 
the London Stock Exchange by acquiring certain securities outside of the 
U.S. but it then takes those securities to U.S. territory and puts them under 
custody of a custodian agent in the U.S., the U.S. courts will have 
jurisdiction to hear claims based upon such financial activity. Indeed, 
bringing the securities to the U.S. would most likely qualify as an act 
performed in the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere. 
The second prong of the “commercial activity” exception in 
§ 1605(a)(2) was discussed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Kensington v. Itoua where the court endorsed an earlier 
judgment by the Fifth Circuit which had indicated that the second prong 
“is generally understood to apply to non-commercial acts in the United 
States that relate to commercial acts abroad.”113 In a more recent judgment 
of the same court, it was held that certain e-mail sent to the plaintiff from 
                                                                                                             
109 Triple A Intern., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 721 F.3d 415, 417 (2013). 
110 Id. 
111 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615-
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112 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358 (1993). 
113 Kensington Intern. Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 157 (2007) (referring to Byrd v. 
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the U.S. constituted notice to the plaintiffs of the alleged breach, rather 
than the actual mechanism of breach which occurred abroad. Thus, such 
act could not fall within the purview of the second clause.114 In other 
words, such an e-mail was not considered to be an act performed in the 
U.S. in connection with a “commercial activity” of the foreign State 
elsewhere. 
Finally, in the case of the third prong of § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, if 
for example, the foreign State invests the SWF funds outside of the U.S., 
then the U.S. courts will have jurisdiction to hear a claim based upon such 
financial activity as long as it causes a “direct effect” in the U.S. 
Importantly, such “direct effect” would have to be something more than a 
“purely trivial effect.”115 For example, if the securities’ price is paid in the 
U.S., it would likely constitute an activity that causes a “direct effect” in 
the U.S. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Weltover is also useful in relation 
to the third prong of the “commercial activities” exception in § 1605(a)(2). 
Weltover serves to clarify in what occasion an act outside the territory of 
the U.S. in connection with a “commercial activity” of the foreign State 
elsewhere causes a “direct effect” in the U.S.  The Supreme Court stated 
in relevant parts: 
[J]urisdiction may not be predicated on purely trivial 
effects in the United States. But we reject the suggestion 
[by the Court of Appeals] that § 1605(a)(2) contains any 
unexpressed requirement of ‘substantiality’ or 
‘foreseeability.’ As the Court of Appeals recognized, an 
effect is ‘direct’ if it follows ‘as an immediate 
consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.’”116 
The Supreme Court also stated the following: 
We nonetheless have little difficulty concluding that 
Argentina’s unilateral rescheduling of the maturity dates 
on the Bonods had a ‘direct effect’ in the United States. 
Respondents had designated their accounts in New York 
as the place of payment, and Argentina made some 
interest payments into those accounts before announcing 
that it was rescheduling the payments. Because New York 
was thus the place of performance for Argentina’s 
                                                                                                             
114 Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
115 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (“Jurisdiction may 
not be predicated on purely trivial effects in the [U.S.].”). 
116 Id. 
30 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
 
ultimate contractual obligations, the rescheduling of those 
obligations necessarily had a ‘direct effect’ in the United 
States: Money that was supposed to have been delivered 
to a New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming.117 
Thus, generally, where a contract states that the place of payment is in 
the U.S. and there is a lack thereof, it may be argued that such lack of 
payment causes a “direct effect” in the U.S. 
In a 2014 case decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, involving, in fact, a SWF owned and operated by 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the SWF Samruk–Kazyna JSC, the court 
discussed the “direct effects” prong of the commercial activity exception 
to immunity under § 1605(a)(2).118 The Samruk–Kazyna JSC case dealt 
with certain securities acquired by plaintiffs and issued by an entity 
controlled by the defendant SWF. The Court acknowledged that there was 
no dispute that the nature of the activity engaged in by the SWF was 
“commercial,” as opposed to “sovereign” and, instead, focused on the 
“commercial activity” exception.119 
Plaintiffs had alleged that the entity issuing the securities defaulted on 
the securities at the direction of the defendant SWF.120 The Court had no 
trouble in finding that the claim was based upon acts outside the U.S. in 
connection with a commercial activity of the SWF elsewhere, with “direct 
effects” inside the U.S. In consequence, the court considered the third 
prong of the commercial activity exception under § 1605(a)(2) satisfied.121 
Interestingly, the Samruk–Kazyna JSC court also referred to the Second 
Circuit case of Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua,122 which, in line with 
Weltover, determined that the “direct effect” need not be substantial or 
foreseeable, but it must be something more than trivial or incidental.123 
Also, the Samruk–Kazyna JSC court determined that, in any event, 
even if the “direct effects” exception did not apply, the SWF’s alleged 
conduct within the U.S. would be sufficient to create jurisdiction under the 
first prong of the commercial activity exception under § 1605(a)(2) of the 
FSIA.124 
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Therefore, where the State properly engages in an activity that, 
pursuant to the nature test, may be characterized as commercial and 
satisfies one of the three prongs of § 1605(a)(2), no immunity from 
jurisdiction will apply. 
It can be concluded that immunity from jurisdiction will apply in all 
cases involving pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a ministry of finance in 
the defendant’s side.  At the same time, three possible “commercial 
activity” scenarios could occur, enabling the “commercial activity” 
exception to immunity from jurisdiction. Thus, where any such pool-of-
assets-SWF is engaged in one of the three “commercial activity” scenarios 
discussed above, the “commercial activity” exception to immunity from 
jurisdiction would operate and the U.S. courts will have jurisdiction to hear 
the case. In all these cases, the commercial character of the SWF activity 
will be determined by reference to the “nature” of the particular financial 
transaction, activity or act rather than by reference to its “purpose.” 
Because they are governmental entities, the grant of immunity from 
jurisdiction to SWFs is reasonable and practical. At the same time, the 
“commercial activities” exception plays a key role in allowing courts to 
entertain cases against SWFs as a result of their commercial operations. 
b. Pool–of–Assets–SWFs Managed by Foreign Central 
Banks or Monetary Authorities and Immunity from 
Jurisdiction 
Instead of being managed by a ministry, a SWF that is a pool of assets 
may be managed by a foreign central bank or monetary authority. But, 
what are central banks or monetary authorities? Foreign central banks or 
monetary authorities are only mentioned in the FSIA in connection to their 
special regime of immunity from execution. Nevertheless, they are not 
defined. Yet, foreign central banks or monetary authorities are protected 
by a special regime of immunity from execution. Thus, this article 
elaborates on the definition and functions of foreign central banks and 
monetary authorities in the relevant section on pool-of-assets-SWFs 
managed by central banks and sovereign immunity from execution. 
For now, it suffices to say that most modern central banks or monetary 
authorities have separate legal personality. Yet, if a central bank or 
monetary authority managing a pool-of-assets SWF does not have separate 
legal personality from the State (which is rare at present times), for 
purposes of immunity from jurisdiction, the case would be identical to that 
of a SWF managed by a ministry. Additionally, even if the central bank 
managing a pool-of-assets SWF has separate legal personality, the regime 
of immunity from jurisdiction will be similar although the entity ultimately 
covered by immunity would be the very central bank. 
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Indeed, the FSIA is structured in such a way that those State entities 
protected under its aegis are considered as the “foreign State” itself for 
purposes of such federal law. In other words, in order to extend sovereign 
immunity to certain foreign State entities, the FSIA extends the definition 
of “foreign State” so as to encompass those entities. As a result, as soon as 
a State entity, such as a central bank, falls within the definition of ‘foreign 
State’ under § 1603(a) FSIA, it will be covered by the rules on sovereign 
immunity from the jurisdiction. Accordingly, an asset-pool SWF managed 
by such central bank will be protected by immunity from jurisdiction. At 
the same time, a central bank may be subject to the “commercial activity” 
exception to immunity from jurisdiction. 
The best example to illustrate this assertion is the case of Weltover, 
which involved a claim against the Republic of Argentina and its central 
bank: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. Both the foreign State 
(Argentina) and its central bank were treated simply as the State with all 
accruing consequences, including the applicability of the “commercial 
activity” exception to the general rule of immunity from adjudication that 
they would have otherwise enjoyed.125 
Although a pool-of-assets-SWF managed by a central bank can get 
involved in a legal dispute against it, technically, the defendant would not 
be the very pool-of-assets-SWF. These type of SWFs do not have separate 
legal personalities. As a result, the claimant would have to name the 
managing central bank as defendant (or the State if the central bank does 
not have its own separate legal personality either). Both entities, the SWF 
that is a pool of assets and the managing central bank would, in any event, 
be protected by the rules of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction 
discussed above. 
As will be discussed in the next subsection, central banks and 
monetary authorities of the State with separate legal personality will 
invariably qualify as “agencies or instrumentalities.” In consequence, they 
will be covered by the regime of immunity from jurisdiction applicable to 
such “agencies or instrumentalities,” which in any event is similar to the 
one applicable to the State proper. 
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aa. Central Banks or Monetary Authorities Qualifying as 
“Agencies or Instrumentalities” 
The FSIA contains specific rules regarding “agencies or 
instrumentalities” of the State, which will be analyzed below in more 
detail. Under such rules, certain SWFs with separate legal personality may 
qualify as “agencies or instrumentalities” of their home or parent states. 
For now, it suffices to say that central banks and monetary authorities of 
the State with separate legal personality will invariably qualify as 
“agencies or instrumentalities,” even though there is no express indication 
in the FSIA that they are to be regarded as such.126 
Some well-known commentators opine that central banks or monetary 
authorities must be considered “agencies or instrumentalities.” Paul Lee, 
for example, argues that the FSIA presupposes that a “foreign central 
bank” or “monetary authority” qualifies as an “agency or instrumentality.” 
Clearly, in his view, in order for an entity to qualify as a foreign central 
bank or monetary authority, it must first meet the definitional requirements 
of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign State.127 In support of his 
position, Lee quotes from the House Report where it is indicated that it is 
possible, but unlikely, that in a particular instance a foreign central bank 
may be deemed to be part of the foreign State itself comparable to the case 
of a ministry of finance or treasury.128 
Another renowned commentator on the subject, Mr. Ernest Patrikis, 
has stated that most foreign central banks undoubtedly would qualify as 
agents or instrumentalities of the foreign states for purposes of the general 
provisions of the FSIA.129 Thomas Baxter likewise opines that most 
central banks would be considered “instrumentalities” of their 
                                                                                                             
126 See Tomas Baxter Jr., General Counsel and Exec. Vice President, The Fed. Reserve 
Bank of New York, Remarks at the Central Reserve Bank of Peru on the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act and Central Bank Immunity in the United States, Speech: Recent 
Developments in Key Legal Issues of International Reserves Investments (Nov. 16, 2010) 
(transcript available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2010/bax101119
.html) (stating that the FSIA contains no definition of the terms “central bank” or 
“monetary authority”). Baxter contends that, while the meaning of those terms seems 
obvious, there is considerable diversity from country to country, and that there are some 
unusual cases. Thus, certain U.S. courts have rejected arguments of some entities claiming 
to be central banks. Id. at n.29. 
127 Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
327, 350 (2003). 
128 Lee, supra note 127, at 327 n.81 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1604, 6614). 
129 Ernest T Patrikis, Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity from Attachment in the 
United States, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (1982) (pointing to a Letter from the 
Department of Justice and Department of State to the President of the Senate, in which the 
organizations recognized that a foreign central bank fall within the definition of “agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state.”). 
34 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
 
governments under the FSIA.130 In S & S Machinery Co. v. 
Masinexportimport the Second Circuit held: “State-owned central banks 
indisputably are included in the § 1603(b) definition of ‘agency or 
instrumentality.’”131 
As a result, most foreign central banks or monetary authorities, will 
be subject to the regime of immunity from jurisdiction applicable to 
“agencies or instrumentalities.” 
C. SWFs with Separate Legal Personality from the State 
Qualifying as “Agencies or Instrumentalities” and Immunity 
from Jurisdiction 
A key provision in the FSIA is § 1603 subsection (a), which states that 
a “foreign State” includes a political subdivision of a foreign State or an 
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign State.” Pursuant to this provision, 
an entity that is able to demonstrate that it qualifies under the definition of 
“agency or instrumentality” will enjoy the immunity of jurisdiction that 
the FSIA affords to foreign states. Furthermore, § 1603 FSIA subsection 
(b) lists the requirements for an entity to qualify as such “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign State.” That entity would have to be: (1) a 
separate legal person, corporate or otherwise; (2) which is an “organ” of a 
foreign State or political subdivision thereof, or a “majority of whose 
shares or other ownership interest is owned” by a foreign State or political 
subdivision thereof; and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the U.S. 
nor created under the laws of any third country. 
Pursuant to § 1603(b)(1), the entity must, under the law by which it 
was created, be capable of suing or being sued, contracting and holding 
property in its own name.132 Secondly, § 1603(b)(2) has two prongs: (1) 
either the entity is an “organ” or political subdivision of the foreign State, 
or, (2) alternatively, a “majority of its shareholding must be owned” by the 
foreign State. Importantly, as was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Dole Food Co., only direct subsidiaries of a foreign State would qualify as 
“agencies or instrumentalities.”133 Thus, under the second prong, the 
shareholding must be direct. The case of Dole Food Co. will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
Finally, as per § 1603(b)(3), a State entity claiming immunity as an 
“agency or instrumentality” must be incorporated under the laws of the 
home foreign State. Indeed, it is assumed that incorporation outside the 
home State would mean that such agencies are engaged in activities of a 
                                                                                                             
130 Baxter Jr., supra note 126. 
131 S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1983). 
132 HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 251 (3d ed., 2013). 
133 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
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commercial or private law nature and hence are not protected by 
immunity.134 So, as may be seen, under the FSIA, an “agency or 
instrumentality” of a foreign State must be a legal person which is an 
“organ” or the majority of its shares must be directly owned by that foreign 
State. In addition, that legal person or entity must have the nationality of 
the foreign State. 
Because by virtue of § 1603 subsections (a) and (b) of the FSIA, 
certain SWFs with separate legal personality may qualify as “agencies or 
instrumentalities” of a foreign State, they will also be considered as the 
foreign State for purposes of immunity from jurisdiction. As such, § 1605 
FSIA will be applicable to those SWFs and they will be subject to the 
exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction that apply to foreign states. 
Pursuant to the three requirements of § 1603(b) FSIA, a number of 
SWFs with separate legal personality will qualify as “agencies or 
instrumentalities” of their parent states while others will not. For most of 
them, meeting the requirements of § 1603(b)(1) and § 1603(b)(3) will not 
be difficult. First, they are separate legal persons, corporate or otherwise, 
under their domestic laws. As such, those SWFs would meet the 
requirement set forth by § 1603(b)(1) FSIA. At the same time, most, if not 
all, SWFs are created or registered under the laws of their own home states. 
Therefore, for most SWFs, it will not be difficult to meet the citizenship 
requirement under § 1603(b)(3) FSIA. 
The two alternative requirements of § 1603(b)(2) could be a bit more 
problematic, though. While it is possible that the foreign State “owns a 
majority of shareholding” (second prong), the U.S. Supreme Court 
judgment in Dole Food Co., may be an obstacle for a number of SWFs to 
benefit from sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Pursuant to Dole Food 
Co., indirect holding or “tiering” of State instrumentalities will not 
suffice.135 The Supreme Court stated: 
The Dead Sea Companies, as indirect subsidiaries of the 
State of Israel, were not instrumentalities of Israel under 
the FSIA at any time. Those companies cannot come 
within the statutory language which grants status as an 
instrumentality of a foreign state to an entity a ‘majority 
of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by 
a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.’ 
§ 1603(b)(2). We hold that only direct ownership of a 
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majority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the 
statutory requirement.136 
 . . .  
The better rule is the one supported by the statutory text 
and elementary principles of corporate law. A corporation 
is an instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA 
only if the foreign state itself owns a majority of the 
corporation’s shares.137 
Therefore, any SWF that is not directly held by the State will not be 
considered as an “agency or instrumentality” under the “majority 
ownership” prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. Yet, even if a SWF fails to 
qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” under the “majority ownership” 
(second prong), it may still qualify for sovereign immunity if it can 
establish that it is an “organ” of a foreign State or a political subdivision 
thereof (first prong).138 
Nevertheless, as will be shown by the following account of the Capital 
Trans Int’l v IPIC et al. case,139 decided by the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida, qualifying as an “organ” of the foreign State 
may not be so easy for certain SWFs. As a result, should a SWF fail to 
qualify under both prongs of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA, it will not be considered 
as an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign State. Accordingly, it will 
not be covered by immunity from jurisdiction. In other words, a SWF with 
separate legal personality that does not qualify for “agency or 
instrumentality” status will not be protected by immunity from 
jurisdiction. 
a. The “Organ” Prong in § 1603(b)(2) FSIA: The Case 
of Capital Trans Int’l 
The Capital Trans Int’l case is useful to illustrate the discussion on the 
“organ” prong under § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. That judgment is a relatively 
recent one, where the “organ” prong was approached in a less than 
orthodox way. At the same time, it will also serve to analyze in more detail 
the “direct ownership” requirement under Dole Food Co. 
In 2010, Capital Trans International LLC (“CTI”), a company 
registered under the laws of Florida, filed a breach of contract claim 
                                                                                                             
136 Patrickson, 538 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
138 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 995. 
139 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC v. Int’l Petroleum Inv. Co., No. 8:10-cv-529-T-30TWG, 
2013 WL 557236 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part). 
2016-2017] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY & SWFS 37 
 
against three foreign corporate entities: International Petroleum 
Investment Company (“IPIC”), which happens to be one of Abu Dhabi’s 
SWFs;140 Aabar Investments PJSC (“Aabar”); and Tasameem Real Estate 
Company LLC (“Tasameem”). While, from the outset, IPIC was described 
as a wholly-owned instrumentality of Abu Dhabi, Aabar was referred to 
as a public joint stock company 75.5% owned by IPIC (the remaining 
24.5% owned by the public). Tasameem, on the other hand, was described 
as a private company with no governmental involvement. 
CTI alleged that the U.S. District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over IPIC and Aabar as instrumentalities of a foreign State (Abu Dhabi) 
that were engaged in commercial activity having a direct effect in the 
U.S.141 Not surprisingly, IPIC and Aabar moved to dismiss the action 
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, invoking inter alia sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA.142 The Court, in turn, started off by reviewing 
the “instrumentality” status of IPIC and Aabar under § 1603 FSIA. 
IPIC was a separate legal person (§ 1603(b)(1) FSIA) and it was 
neither a citizen of the U.S. nor had it been created under the laws of any 
third country. That is, it was created under the laws of Abu Dhabi 
(§ 1603(b)(3) FSIA). Furthermore, IPIC’s status as an entity wholly 
owned by the Abu Dhabi government was not contested. Thus, the Court 
readily concluded that IPIC also met the second prong of § 1603(b)(2) 
FSIA.143 Accordingly, the Court determined that IPIC was an 
“instrumentality” of Abu Dhabi because it fulfilled all three criteria listed 
in § 1603(b) FSIA. However, the Capital Trans Int’l court did not discuss 
whether IPIC was directly or indirectly owned by Abu Dhabi. As was 
already stated, pursuant to the “direct ownership test” spelled out by the 
Supreme Court in Dole Food Co.,144 in order to qualify as an 
“instrumentality” direct shareholding by the foreign State is required. 
In a similar fashion, in another recent case involving a SWF with 
separate corporate legal personality and without much discussion, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York readily accepted that 
the SWF Samruk–Kazyna JSC qualified as a “foreign State” for purposes 
of § 1603(a) FSIA. The Court simply recorded that there was no dispute 
                                                                                                             
140 The SWF Institute describes IPIC as a Joint Stock Company SWF. See International 
Petroleum Investment Company, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE, http://www.swfin
stitute.org/swfs/international-petroleum-investment-company/ (last visited July 11, 2016). 
141 Because Tasameem was not considered a State entity, CTI did not have to allege 
jurisdiction over Tasameem through the exceptions to sovereign immunity under FSIA. 
See Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236 at *3. 
142 Defendants also moved to dismiss on lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. 
143 Id. at *7. 
144 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003). 
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from the parties in that connection.145 As a result, it was not explained 
whether the Samruk–Kazyna JSC SWF was considered an “organ” or an 
entity meeting the “majority ownership” test under § 1603(b)(2) FSIA, in 
order to be considered an “instrumentality” of a foreign State. 
Although the Capital Trans Int’l court considered IPIC an 
“instrumentality,” it determined that it possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction. Indeed, because of the plaintiff’s breach of oral contract 
allegations, the court determined that the third prong of the commercial 
activity exception under § 1605(a)(2) FSIA was satisfied. It concluded that 
entering into a contract—albeit elsewhere—was clearly commercial 
activity. Thus, failure to perform a contractual obligation to pay in the U.S. 
would qualify as a “direct effect” under the third prong of § 1605(a)(2) 
FSIA.146 Importantly, one notable factor weighed by the court was that 
CTI alleged that the place of payment was the State of Florida and IPIC 
did not point to any contradictory evidence.147 
In relation to Aabar, the Court considered that it plainly satisfied the 
requirements of § 1603(b)(1) and (b)(3) FSIA, being a corporation 
organized under the laws of the United Arab Emirates (“U.A.E.”), not any 
third country. However, in the case of Aabar, the Court did refer to the 
Dole Food Co. “direct ownership” requirement. In that connection, the 
court determined that, because neither the government of Abu Dhabi nor 
the U.A.E. directly owned any stock in Aabar, the second—or direct 
ownership—prong of § 1603(b)(2) could not apply to draw Aabar within 
the reach of FSIA’s instrumentality status.148 
At the same time, CTI had alleged that, as per § 1603(b)(2) FSIA (first 
prong), Aabar was an “instrumentality” of the government of Abu Dhabi, 
being an “organ” of said government.149 Confronted with such argument 
by CTI, the court regretted the lack of a clear test for determining “agency 
or instrumentality” status under the § 1603(b)(2) “organ” prong. In fact, 
quoting from the case of USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co.,150 the court 
lamented that the FSIA and its legislative history were silent as to a 
definition of the term “organ,” and that such term was inherently vague 
and did not have a well-established common law meaning. Also, the court 
indicated that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit had 
                                                                                                             
145 Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund, No. 12 Civ. 8852 (JMF), 2014 
WL 917055, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 10, 2014). 
146 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *12. 
147 See id. at *12 n.9 (explaining that a declaration by an IPIC officer stating that IPIC 
never agreed to make payments in Florida would have sufficed to create a disputed fact). 
148 Id. at *7. 
149 Id. at *8. 
150 USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 209 (3d. Cir. 2003). 
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articulated a standard for determining when an entity is an “organ.” 
Therefore, the court looked to other circuits for guidance.151 
The court then explained that four federal circuit courts had addressed 
the “organ” prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA and highlighted that three out of 
those four courts of appeals had applied identical standards: (1) the Second 
Circuit in Filler v. Hanvit Bank;152 (2) the Ninth Circuit in EIE Guam 
Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd.;153 and (3) the Fifth Circuit 
in Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V.154 Interestingly, the court then 
emphasized that the “capstone of organ designation” is whether the entity 
engages in a public activity on behalf of a foreign government.155 That is 
a clear indication that the court would favor the use of a “purpose-of-the-
entity” test in order to determine whether an entity qualifies as an “organ” 
under § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. 
Commentator Joel Slawotsky would probably agree with the 
application of that approach to a case involving a SWF. That author has 
argued that in evaluating whether a SWF may be considered as an “organ,” 
its focus must be motivated by a public purpose. That is, if the entity 
engages in a public activity on behalf of the foreign government, it must 
be considered an “organ” under § 1603(b)(2) first prong.156 Slawotsky’s 
opinion was said to be based on EIE Guam Corp.157 That author also 
suggested that the purpose motivating the creation of a SWF should be 
taken into account.158 In other words, Slawotsky would probably support 
the use of a “purpose-of-the-entity” test in an “organ” determination. 
The Capital Trans Int’l court then took into account that the three 
circuit courts in Filler v. Hanvit; EIE Guam Corp.; and Kelly v. Syria Shell 
considered the following five factors, in order to make their “organ” 
determination, immediately discarding the possibility that each of them 
were fulfilled by Aabar so as to qualify as an “organ:”159 
(1) whether the foreign State created the entity for a 
national purpose;160 
                                                                                                             
151 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *6. 
152 Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d. Cir. 2004). 
153 EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
154 Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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157 EIE Guam Corp., 322 F.3d at 635. 
158 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 996. 
159 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *8-10. 
160 Once again, reference to the “purpose” of the entity is invoked in order to determine 
whether it qualifies as an “organ.” 
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(2) whether the foreign State actively supervises the 
entity; 
(3) whether the foreign State requires the hiring of public 
employees and pays their salaries; 
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right 
in the foreign country; and 
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign State law.161 
Interestingly, in conducting the analysis of those five factors or the 
five-prong “organ” test, the Capital Trans Int’l court emphasized, in 
connection to different factors, that the linchpin of the “organ” analysis is 
whether the relevant entity engages in a public activity on behalf of a 
foreign government.162 The court also indicated that the key inquiry in 
order to determine whether an entity qualifies as an “organ” is whether it 
serves primarily a private interest, such as profit maximizing, or a public 
interest, such as industry protection or economic stabilization.163 This is 
noteworthy on at least two accounts. 
First, the reference to whether an entity serves primarily a private 
interest as opposed to a public interest, appears to be in line with a 
“purpose-of-the-entity” test. In other words, the Capital Trans Int’l court 
considered it necessary to apply a “purpose” test in order to decide whether 
Aabar was an “organ.” Under a similar reasoning, Joel Slawotsky has 
argued that whether a particular SWF enjoys immunity depends on its 
purpose as demonstrated by its investments.164 This commentator appears 
to advocate for a denial of immunity where the SWF’s conduct truly 
constitutes a commercial activity, or conduct that can be exercised by 
private citizens, as opposed to sovereign activity.165 
                                                                                                             
161 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *6. This five-factor approach has been 
heavily criticized. See Michael A. Granne, Defining “Organ of a Foreign State” Under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2008). This 
commentator submits that the courts approaches fail under a number of grounds. He argues 
that in determining when an enterprise is an “organ,” courts should focus on whether the 
denial of sovereign status has the potential to interfere with diplomatic relations between 
the US and the relevant foreign State. To measure the potential for interference with the 
conduct of foreign relations, courts must look at the extent to which the sovereign would 
be justifiably affronted if the entity were not treated as its organ. Id. at 1-2. 
162 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *10 (quoting EIE Guam Corp. v. Long 
Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322 F.3d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
163 Id. at *9. 
164 Slawotsky, supra note 70, at 974. 
165 This commentator does not openly say that SWFs’ sovereign conduct should trigger 
a grant of immunity. Yet, that is the message that he seems to try to convey. Id. 
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Under that kind of reasoning, an entity qualifying as an “organ” on the 
basis of the “purpose” that it primarily serves, which also qualifies as an 
“instrumentality,” could, notwithstanding, be hauled into U.S. courts as 
long as—by reference to the “nature” test—its course of conduct or 
particular transaction or act is of a commercial character (by virtue of the 
“commercial activity” exception to sovereign immunity). This result 
appears somehow paradoxical. 
Secondly, as was previously indicated, the court referred to “public 
interest,” mentioning, as it did, industry protection and economic 
stabilization as examples. The reference to economic stabilization as a 
public interest activity is very relevant in a SWF context. Indeed, one of 
the traditional purposes of SWFs is economic stabilization, and some 
SWFs have as their exclusive purpose economic stabilization. Thus, the 
reference to economic stabilization as a public interest activity suggests 
that the Capital Trans Int’l court would be readily inclined to characterize 
an economic stabilization SWF as an “organ” of the parent foreign State. 
In the same sense, Joel Slawotsky appears to suggest that the five basic 
categories of SWFs identified by the IMF on the basis of their main 
objectives, i.e., stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment 
corporations, development funds and contingent pension reserve funds,166 
should be all granted immunity.167 Where courts are satisfied that the 
purpose of a SWF is one of, e.g., reserve investment or one of stabilization, 
they should be covered by sovereign immunity.168 That commentator 
argues that a record of investments would serve to corroborate whether a 
stated sovereign intended purpose is true. Conversely, if the SWF’s 
investment record establishes a pattern of, e.g., investing in highly 
speculative derivate transactions, that would serve to undermine the stated 
sovereign goal. As a result, such SWF should not be afforded immunity.169 
At the same time, Slawotsky considers that where SWFs have more 
than one purpose, it is more difficult to determine whether the commercial 
activity exception to sovereign immunity applies.170 Such reasoning shows 
that author’s inclination to make the grant of sovereign immunity 
dependent on the purpose of the entity or SWF as a whole. In other words, 
Slawotsky’s argumentation suggests that, in his view, a SWF conducting 
stabilization, savings, reserve investment or development activities could 
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not be stripped of sovereign immunity on the basis of the “commercial 
activity” exception. 
That result seems incorrect. It runs afoul to the “nature” test provided 
for by § 1603(d) FSIA and is contrary to the conclusions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Weltover. It is the submission of this article that, despite 
the purpose of a SWF, should it engage in any financial activity that meets 
the requisites of § 1605(a)(2) FSIA, such SWF could be brought to the 
courts of the U.S. on the basis of the “commercial activity” exception to 
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the proposed focus in the “organ” 
prong fails to address the inequalities arising out of the “direct ownership” 
test. For example, a SWF that is directly held by the State would 
automatically qualify as an “agency or instrumentality,” regardless of 
whether its “purpose” is not public, i.e., entirely commercial. 
In this connection, in order to solve complex problems of 
classification of transactions, which is useful to assess cases where the 
“commercial activity” exception is being dealt with, Judge James 
Crawford proposes the use of the method of “individuation” in order to 
isolate the particular act or transaction by virtue of which the State is said 
not to be immune.171 This method requires the court to differentiate 
between, on the one hand, the immediate or proximate and, on the other, 
the remote or ulterior aspects of the claim.172 Such isolation or 
differentiation will serve to identify the relevant transaction which will in 
turn be used for iure imperii/iure gestionis classifications. 
The most obvious difficultly of the method of individuation is the 
aspect of remoteness. A particular act usually has ramifications forward in 
time and is part of some larger activity or purpose.173 Even though Judge 
Crawford questions the terminology of the “nature/purpose” distinction, 
he submits that its intent to distinguish the narrower from the broader 
aspects or descriptions of a transaction can be legitimate. For that matter, 
Crawford recasts the “nature/purpose” distinction and submits that in 
assessing foreign State immunity with respect to a particular transaction, 
it is necessary first, to identify the relevant transaction as precisely and 
narrowly as is reasonably possible having regard to the factual and legal 
issues. Then, if so described, the transaction can fairly be classified as a 
“commercial transaction,” then it will not lose that character or 
                                                                                                             
171 James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune 
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classification because extraneous facts or aspects surrounding the 
individual transaction suggest or would attract a different classification.174 
To illustrate with an example, Judge Crawford referred to the U.S. 
judgment issued in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, where the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California stated that: 
An act or activity can be defined broadly, such as ‘hiring 
of employees,’ an activity carried on by private parties, 
and thus, ‘commercial,’ or it can be defined narrowly, 
such as, ‘employment of diplomatic . . . personnel,’ a 
governmental activity.175 
In the same vein, Judge Crawford argues that a single act might be 
described, for example, as publishing a journal, defaming the plaintiff, co-
operating with the State authorities, or fulfilling the defendant’s statutory 
mandate, or as striking at the enemy, giving one’s own company a 
monopoly, stealing the property of another, returning to the people control 
over (part of) the economy, and so on.176 All these different 
characterizations of a single event may be accurate, depending on the level 
of abstraction of the characterization. 
Applying such method of “individuation” to the investments of a 
SWF, the closest or narrower aspects of a transaction, as opposed to the 
most remote aspects or even objectives, would be the ones to be taken into 
account for sovereign immunity determinations. As Lady Hazel Fox has 
recalled, the criterion of the “nature” of the act has been recently applied 
narrowly so as not to classify the whole transaction but to focus on 
individual provisions and to remove immunity in respect of those common 
to commercial transactions.177 
Once the Capital Trans Int’l court referred to the five-factor test of 
Filler v. Hanvit; EIE Guam Corp.; and Kelly v. Syria Shell, for purposes 
of “organ” determination, it revealed its disagreement with the Third 
Circuit when it added an additional “ownership structure of the entity” 
factor in USX Corp. The Capital Trans Int’l court opined that the 
additional factor drastically alters the analysis in cases involving tiered 
corporate ownership and circumvents the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Dole Food Co. which discarded the “tiering” theory of sovereign 
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immunity.178 In this connection, the Third Circuit had articulated the 
additional “ownership structure of the entity” factor in USX Corp. as 
follows: 
Under the organ prong, as opposed to the majority 
ownership prong of section 1603(b)(2), a foreign state 
might own only 10% of an entity; it might own directly 
50% of the entity; or it might own even 100% of a holding 
company that owns 100% of the entity. On the other hand 
it is possible that a foreign state might not own any portion 
of any entity that nevertheless is its organ as section 
1603(b)(2) does not require a foreign state to have any 
ownership interest in an entity for it to be its organ. Courts 
should consider how these different ownership structures 
might influence the degree to which an entity is 
performing a function ‘on behalf of the foreign 
government.’179 
However, the Capital Trans Int’l Court stated that adherence to the 
extra prong of the Third Circuit would eviscerate the Supreme Court’s 
careful analysis in Dole Food Co. of the Congressional intent behind 
§ 1603(b)(2) FSIA.180 Also, the Capital Trans Int’l court considered that 
the Third Circuit’s view would nullify the particular terms Congress 
selected in the FSIA, thereby opening the “organ” prong for all minority 
held corporations to become instrumentalities when they do not qualify 
under the “majority ownership” prong because they are controlled through 
tiered corporate intermediaries.181 Thus, the court indicated that it would 
adopt the five-prong test as articulated by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits. 
It is important to note, nevertheless, that neither Filler v. Hanvit; EIE 
Guam Corp.; or Kelly v. Syria Shell, nor other judgments that have been 
issued by their respective circuits after USX Corp., have rejected the 
“ownership structure of the entity” factor added by the Third Circuit in 
that judgment.182 In fact, Filler v. Hanvit was issued by the Second Circuit 
after USX Corp. and it did not address the “ownership structure of the 
entity” factor. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued e.g. 
                                                                                                             
178 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC v. Int’l Petroleum Inv. Co., No. 8:10-cv-529-T-30TWG, 
2013 WL 557236, *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part). 
179 USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 209 (3d Cir. 2003). 
180 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *6. 
181 Id. at *6 n.3. 
182 USX Corp., 345 F.3d at 209. 
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California v. NRG Energy Inc.183 after EIE Guam Corp. and, of course, 
after USX Corp. and it did not address the “ownership structure of the 
entity” factor either. Likewise, the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in the case 
of Board of Regents of University of Texas System v. Nippon Telephone 
and Telegraph Corp.,184 did refer to USX Corp. (rendered after Kelly v. 
Syria Shell) but did not disapprove the “ownership structure of the entity” 
factor. 
In addition, adherence to the Third Circuit’s “ownership structure of 
the entity” extra factor would not eviscerate, in reality, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Dole Food Co. In fact, the “ownership structure of the 
entity” factor is just one among five other factors, which may serve as 
guidance to determine whether an entity is an “organ” under the 
§ 1603(b)(2) FSIA first prong. Conversely, the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in Dole Food Co. refers to the “majority ownership” or second prong of 
§ 1603(b)(2) FSIA. 
In any event, to require “direct ownership” so as to satisfy the “organ” 
prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA, seems rather redundant. The outcome would 
be that every “organ” would have to meet the “direct ownership” requisite. 
Should that be the case, the distinction between an “organ” and an entity 
a majority of whose shares were owned by the State would be meaningless. 
In other words, any “organ” with separate legal personality that were 
created under the laws of its parent State as per § 1603(b)(1) and (3) would 
also qualify under the second or “majority ownership” prong of 
§ 1603(b)(2) FSIA. Such result would be contrary to the language of 
§ 1603(b)(2), which uses the word “or” and distinguishes “organs” from 
corporate persons a “majority of whose shares is owned by a foreign 
State.” 
Commentators and case law have not required “direct ownership” in 
the case of “organs.” Michael Granne, for example, has submitted that for 
those entities that do not or cannot satisfy the ownership requirements, 
“organ” is the only refuge.185 This commentator argues that only with a 
definition of “organ” that fills in the gaps among the agencies and 
instrumentalities that a foreign government directly owns can § 1603(b)(2) 
properly reflect the congressional intent.186 Granne even suggests that 
certain SWFs may qualify as “organs” of a foreign State.187 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                             
183 California v. NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2004) (vacated in part by 
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007)). 
184 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Nippon Tel. and Tel. Corp., 478 F.3d 274 
(5th Cir. 2007). 
185 Granne, supra note 72, at 3. 
186 Id. at 17. 
187 Id. at 2, 50. 
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Capital Trans Int’l judgment made a wrong interpretation of § 1603(b)(2) 
FSIA. 
Be that as it may, consistent with its position, the Capital Trans Int’l 
court rejected what it called an “inaccurate equation” of IPIC with the Abu 
Dhabi government. It appears like, in the court’s view, CTI had argued, 
and for purposes of obtaining subject matter jurisdiction, that IPIC’s 
ownership of up to 95.3% shareholding in Aabar constituted an indirect 
acquisition by Abu Dhabi. Yet, the court concluded that IPIC and the Abu 
Dhabi government were not interchangeable with regards to § 1603 FSIA 
because: “IPIC does not become a ‘foreign state;’ rather, IPIC is subsumed 
within the term ‘foreign state’ but does not possess the ability to confer 
instrumentality status on other corporate entities.”188 This approach has 
obvious consequences for SWFs with separate legal personality. Unless 
they are directly held by the State, they will not qualify for State immunity 
under either prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. 
In the case of Wultz v. Iran, another case where one of the defendants 
was connected to SWFs, the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit 
determined that an indirect subsidiary of a State (China) could not qualify 
as an instrumentality under the FSIA. Indeed, defendant Bank of China, 
which was a subsidiary of China’s SAFE (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange),189 also known in Chinese as Central Huijin Investment 
Company, did not qualify as an instrumentality of China because such 
bank was not directly owned by China. In consequence, the Court ruled 
that the Bank of China was not entitled to immunity.190 
As may be observed from the judgment, not only the Bank of China 
was owned by SAFE but also SAFE was indirectly owned by the State. 
SAFE was, in fact, a subsidiary of China’s SWF: China Investment 
Corporation (“CIC”). This judgment suggests that, had both SAFE and 
CIC been co-defendants, only CIC would have been entitled to sovereign 
immunity as an “instrumentality.”191 In addition, this judgment of Wultz v. 
Iran is relevant on two accounts. First, the Court indicated that it follows 
                                                                                                             
188 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *9 (order granting motion to dismiss 
in part) (citing Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
189 The Wultz v. Iran judgment is a little confusing in that it refers to China SAFE 
Investments Limited as if it were the same entity as the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2010). 
(It is assumed that the Court is referring to SAFE Investment Company as SAFE 
Investments Limited). However, the Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute, which qualifies 
SAFE Investment Company as a SWF, indicates that such company is a subsidiary of 
SAFE. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS INSTITUTE, Safe Investment Company, http://www
.swfinstitute.org/swfs/safe-investment-company/ (last visited July 11, 2016). This would 
mean that Bank of China would be yet another layer below China. 
190 Wultz, 755 F. Supp.2d at 30. 
191 Id. 
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a “categorical approach when” determining whether a foreign 
governmental entity should be considered “a foreign state or political 
subdivision” rather than an “agency or instrumentality of the nation.”192 
Under such categorical approach, if the core functions of the entity are 
governmental, it is considered the foreign State itself. However, if the core 
functions are commercial, the entity is considered as an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign State. Upon finding that an entity’s core 
functions are commercial, a district court must determine whether the 
entity constitutes an agency or instrumentality as per § 1603(b) FSIA.193 
That approach was certainly not shared by the Capital Trans Int’l 
judgment nor it is supported by the judgments quoted therein, i.e., Filler 
v. Hanvit; EIE Guam Corp.; and Kelly v. Syria Shell. 
The second interesting feature of the Wultz v. Iran judgment is that the 
court did not even mention the possibility that Bank of China could qualify 
as an “organ” under the first prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. Such lack of 
mention to the first prong of § 1603(b)(2) gives the impression that, for 
the court, only entities directly owned by the State could qualify as 
instrumentalities.194 
The rationale behind the “direct ownership” rule is not entirely clear. 
Such rule provides for a difference in the treatment of SOEs merely based 
on whether they are directly as opposed to indirectly held by the State, 
without more. That “direct ownership” rule has obvious consequences for 
those cases involving SWFs with separate legal personality as defendants. 
Indeed, if any such SWF is directly held by the State or by a political 
subdivision, it will automatically qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” 
and it may be covered by sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Conversely, 
if an identical SWF is not directly held by the State or by any political 
subdivision thereof, it will not qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” 
under the second prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. And, if the Capital Trans 
Int’l approach is adopted, such SWF will in no case qualify as an “agency 
or instrumentality.” 
The “direct ownership” rule spelled out by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Dole Food Co. was very much based on a literal interpretation of the FSIA. 
The Supreme Court said: 
In issues of corporate law structure often matters. 
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194 Bank of China certainly did not allege being an organ of China. However, it did not 
allege being covered by immunity under the FSIA and yet the Court delved into such 
analysis sua sponte. Id. at 28. 
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 . . .  
The language of § 1603(b)(2) refers to ownership of 
‘shares,’ showing that Congress intended statutory 
coverage to turn on formal corporate ownership. 
 . . .  
A basic tenet of American corporate law is that the 
corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities.195 
 . . .  
The text of the FSIA gives no indication that Congress 
intended us to depart from the general rules regarding 
corporate formalities.196 
Then, the Supreme Court continued: 
The Dead Sea Companies would have us read ‘other 
ownership interest’ to include a state’s ‘interest’ in its 
instrumentality’s subsidiary. The better reading of the 
text, in our view, does not support this argument. 
 . . .  
The statute had to be written for the contingency of 
ownership forms in other countries, or even in this 
country, that depart from conventional corporate 
structures. The statutory phrase ‘other ownership interest’ 
is best understood to accomplish this objective. 
 . . .  
Control and ownership . . . however, are distinct concepts. 
 . . .  
Majority ownership by a foreign state, not control, is the 
benchmark of instrumentality status.197 
To apply such “direct ownership” requirement to the case of SWFs 
appears rather problematic. In fact, to make the grant of sovereign 
                                                                                                             
195 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003). 
196 Id. at 476. 
197 Id. at 476-77. 
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immunity dependent upon the position of a SWF in the State chain of 
ownership does not follow an obvious logic. Regardless of the policy 
choice on whether or not SWFs, as modern forms of State financial 
activities that behave as merchants, should be afforded immunity, the 
determinant factor should be other that the mere position of a SWF in the 
corporate chain of State ownership. The potential result of applying the 
“direct ownership” rule would be rather random and would not contribute 
to obtain uniform outcomes. Indeed, if the policy were to make SWFs 
immune, then to deny immunity to SWFs held through other State entities 
and yet afford immunity to SWFs that are directly held by the State would 
fall short of a clear rationale. The practical results of that kind of 
differential treatment may suggest the need for specific immunity rules 
applicable to SWFs. Obviously the FSIA was crafted at a time when SWFs 
had no role in the transnational litigation scenario. Yet, and amendment to 
the FSIA, particular to the case involving SWFs, may be in order. 
In any event, Justice’s Breyer dissenting opinion in Dole Food Co., 
joined by Justice O’Connor, show certain concerns in connection to the 
“direct ownership” rule. They stated: 
Does this type of majority-ownership interest count as an 
example of what the statute calls an ‘other ownership 
interest’? The Court says no, holding that the text of the 
FSIA requires that ‘only direct ownership of a majority of 
shares by the foreign state satisfies the statutory 
requirement.’ . . .  I disagree. 
 . . .  
[T]he words ‘other ownership interest’ might, or might 
not, refer to the kind of majority-ownership interest that 
arises when one owns the shares of a parent that, in turn, 
owns a subsidiary. 
 . . .  
[T]here is no reason to read the phrase ‘shares or other’ 
as if those words meant to exclude from the scope of 
‘other’ any kind of mixed, say, debt/equity, ownership 
arrangement that might involve shares only in part.198 
Justice Breyer and Justice O’Connor then concluded by asserting that 
their interpretation was in line with what they deemed as the purposes of 
the U.S. Congress by enacting the FSIA. They stated: 
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[W]hat might lead Congress to grant protection to a 
Foreign Nation acting through a Corporate Parent but 
deny the same protection to the Foreign Nation acting 
through, for example, a wholly owned Corporate 
Subsidiary? The answer to this question is: In terms of the 
statute’s purposes, nothing at all would lead Congress to 
make such a distinction.199 
 . . .   
To hold, as the Court does today, that for purposes of the 
FSIA ‘other ownership interest’ does not include the 
interest that a Foreign Nation has in a tiered Corporate 
Subsidiary ‘would be not merely to depart from the 
primary rule that words are to be taken in their ordinary 
sense, but to narrow the operation of the statute to an 
extent that would seriously imperil the accomplishment of 
its purpose.’200 
This conclusion of Justices Breyer and O’Connor is absolutely sound 
and plainly applicable to the case of the SWFs. It makes no sense to 
discriminate among the different SWFs, affording immunity to some of 
them while denying it to others, solely based on the circumstance that they 
are, or they are not, directly owned by the State. 
To wrap-up the analysis of the Capital Trans Int’l judgment, it is 
convenient to say that it appears as though the “non-direct ownership” of 
Aabar alone would have sufficed for the court to stop the inquiry and rule 
out Aabar’s status as an instrumentality of the Abu Dhabi government. 
Indeed, by rejecting the Third Circuit’s “ownership structure of the entity” 
factor in USX Corp., the court implicitly stated that, in order to qualify as 
an “organ” under the first prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA, there must be direct 
ownership by the State. Because Aabar was not directly owned by the 
government of Abu Dhabi, under the court’s rationale, it would not have 
been possible that Aabar qualified as an “organ,” even if it met the five 
factors identified by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. However, on 
the basis that the jurisdictional challenge was factual instead of facial, the 
Court delved into an analysis of each of those five factors. Such course of 
action appears to be contradictory. 
In any event, as was already mentioned, the Capital Trans Int’l Court 
discarded the possibility that each and all of the abovementioned five 
factors were fulfilled by Aabar so as to qualify for “organ” status under 
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§ 1603(b)(2) (first prong) FSIA.201 As a result, Aabar could not be 
considered an “agency or instrumentality.” Accordingly, the court 
declared that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction with regard to Aabar. At 
the same time, even though the Capital Trans Int’l court had considered 
satisfied the “commercial activity” exception to sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction with respect to IPIC, it ultimately declined to hear the case on 
the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine.202 Therefore, the case was 
entirely dismissed. 
Other cases involving SWFs, have dealt with less traditional 
exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction 
under the FSIA than the “commercial activity” exception. Although the 
most important exception is the “commercial activity” one, other 
important exceptions to the general rule of immunity from jurisdiction 
include, for example, expropriation cases under § 1605(a)(3) or dispute 
settlement through arbitration under § 1606(6). Coincidentally, one of 
Abu Dhabi’s SWFs: ADIA, one of the largest SWFs in the world and the 
largest in the Middle East,203 has been involved in at least one case before 
the U.S. courts dealing with the “commercial activity” and “expropriation” 
exceptions to the FSIA. Indeed, although unsuccessfully, ADIA has been 
brought to U.S. courts in connection to the alleged property taking in 
violation of international law as an exception to the general rule of State 
immunity under the FSIA.204 At the same time, the case of Citigroup, Inc. 
v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Authority205 shows how the “headline-grabbing” deal of 
ADIA’s US $7.5 Billion investment in Citigroup,206 gave rise to arbitration 
as well as to litigation in the U.S. involving both ADIA and Citigroup. 
As may be grasped from this section, under the U.S. legal system, not 
all SWFs with separate legal personality will automatically enjoy 
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. Only those SWFs that qualify as 
“agencies or instrumentalities” of a foreign State will qualify for such 
immunity. In other words, under the “status” classification of the FSIA, 
SWFs with separate legal personality that do not qualify as “agencies or 
instrumentalities” will not be covered by immunity from jurisdiction. This 
result appears ill-founded. Because of practical considerations, it makes 
                                                                                                             
201 Capital Trans Int’l, LLC v. Int’l Petroleum Inv. Co., No. 8:10-cv-529-T-30TWG, 
2013 WL 557236, *8-10 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in 
part). 
202 Id. at *19. 
203 SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS INSTITUTE, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, http://www.
swfinstitute.org/swfs/abu-dhabi-investment-authority/ (last visited July 11, 2016). 
204 Zappia Middle East Const. Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 
2000). Although incidentally, this case also discussed the “commercial activity” exception 
to the FSIA. Id. at 251. 
205 See Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Authority, 776 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2015). 
206 Gordon & Niles, supra note 7. 
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sense to grant immunity from jurisdiction to “agencies or 
instrumentalities.” However, the characterization of a SWF as an “agency 
or instrumentality” must be consistent. Most importantly, the “commercial 
activity” exception to immunity from jurisdiction should also apply in a 
uniform way. 
2. The U.S. Legal Regime of Sovereign Immunity from 
Execution and SWFs 
Section 1609 of the FSIA declares a general principle of immunity of 
the property of a foreign State from attachment and execution in the U.S. 
At the same time, § 1610 provides for the exceptions to such regime. On 
those premises, this section explores the U.S. legal regime of sovereign 
immunity from execution applicable to: (1) pool-of-assets-SWFs managed 
by the State proper; (2) SWFs with separate legal personality that qualify 
for a status as “agencies or instrumentalities” (this analysis will tacitly 
address the case of SWFs with separate legal personality not qualifying as 
“agencies or instrumentalities” vis-à-vis the regime of immunity from 
execution); and (3) pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a central bank. 
Thus, as will be observed in the next pages, depending on their 
“status” as: (1) pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a ministry of finance; or 
(2) pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a central bank, the U.S. law on State 
immunity from execution regarding foreign states or the rules regarding 
foreign central banks or other monetary authorities would apply. As for 
SWFs with separate legal personality that qualify for a status as “agencies 
or instrumentalities,” the U.S. law on State immunity from execution 
regarding those type of entities will apply. In this connection, depending 
on the “status” of a SWF as a pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by the State, 
a pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a central bank or an “agency or 
instrumentality,” the rule of immunity from execution will vary and the 
outcomes will be somehow divergent. 
A. Pool-of-Assets-SWFs Managed by Ministries and 
Immunity from Execution 
As long as a SWF is managed by the State proper, its assets will be 
immune from execution under the FSIA. Technically, the property, funds 
or assets of a pool-of-assets-SWF managed by a ministry of finance (a 
SWF with “State” status) will be the property of the State proper. Because 
neither the SWF nor the ministry of finance that manages it will have 
separate legal personality from the State, the funds composing the pool 
will not be the property of the SWF but will be the property of the very 
State. 
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At the same time, § 1610(a)(2) FSIA provides for the applicable 
“commercial activity” exception to immunity from execution. It states that 
property in the U.S. of a foreign State (which would cover the case of those 
SWFs with “State” status), used for a commercial activity in the U.S., shall 
not be immune from execution, upon a judgment entered by a U.S. court 
if the property is or was used for the “commercial activity” upon which 
the claim is based. Therefore, a creditor may execute a judgment against 
the funds of a pool-of-assets-SWF managed by the State, used for a 
commercial activity in the U.S., as long as such creditor can establish that 
those funds were used in the very commercial activity that was the basis 
of the dispute that resulted in the judgment sought to be executed. A 
financial investment, for example, would be the typical SWF commercial 
transaction. Thus, if the funds of a pool-of-assets-SWF are invested in the 
capital markets of the U.S., it may be considered that those funds are being 
used for a commercial activity in the U.S. 
As may be surmised, in this case, a U.S. court would have already 
conducted a positive assessment on whether there was a “commercial 
activity” by the State. That court would conduct such assessment on the 
basis of the “nature” test. Thus, the claimant will only have the burden to 
demonstrate the required nexus between the property to be executed and 
the commercial activity upon which the claim was based. Basically, if it 
may be shown that the property has been used for such commercial 
activity, the “commercial activity” exception to immunity from execution 
will operate. 
Section 1603(d) dictates that “commercial activity” includes a 
particular commercial transaction or act. Accordingly, where a judgment 
creditor seeks to execute a judgment against the funds of a pool-of-assets-
SWF, used for a financial investment or commercial activity in the U.S., 
he/she would be able to do so, as long as he/she can establish that those 
funds were used in the very financial investment or commercial activity 
that was the basis of the dispute that resulted in the judgment sought to be 
executed. In other words, the creditor would have to have obtained the 
judgment from a U.S. court against the SWF home State and based upon 
the financial investment accomplished in the U.S. Yet, because of the need 
of a nexus between the activity and the property to be executed, that 
judgment creditor would not be able to execute the same judgment against 
other funds or assets of the State or even the pool-of-assets-SWF. That a 
SWF creditor cannot execute against other funds of the pool-of-assets-
SWF is an undesirable consequence of the “nexus” requirement, and may 
be discriminatory with respect to creditors of SWFs that are “agencies or 
instrumentalities.” 
By the same token, the need of a nexus between the property to be 
executed and the commercial activity upon which the claim is based will 
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be an obstacle for a creditor of the State who holds a judgment that is not 
related to the activities of the SWF. That is; such creditor will not be able 
to execute his or her judgment through the SWF’s assets. However, as will 
be observed when analyzing SWFs with separate legal personality, a 
creditor against those entities would be able to execute against any of their 
assets in the U.S. without the need of a nexus between the property and 
the activity upon which the judgment was obtained. That is the most salient 
difference between the situation of a pool-of-assets-SWF and the situation 
of a SWF with separate legal personality from the State vis-à-vis the 
regime of immunity from execution in the U.S. As may be seen, there will 
be an obvious inequality between the creditors of different SWFs 
depending on the status of the relevant SWF. 
B. SWFs Qualifying as “Agencies or Instrumentalities” and 
Immunity from Execution 
Like the State proper, “agencies or instrumentalities” are also subject 
to the general principle of immunity from execution provided for under 
§ 1609 FSIA. Thus, a SWF that has “agency or instrumentality status” will 
be covered immune from execution. Conversely, SWFs with separate legal 
personality that do not qualify as “agencies or instrumentalities” will not 
be covered immune from execution at all. 
Section 1610(b) FSIA sets forth an exception which is particular to the 
case of “agencies or instrumentalities,” consisting on the possibility of 
execution against any property in the U.S. of an “agency or 
instrumentality” of a foreign State if the “agency or instrumentality” is 
engaged in commercial activity in the U.S.207 Unlike the case of the regime 
of immunity from jurisdiction, “agencies or instrumentalities,” are subject 
to a less stringent regime of immunity from execution than the State 
proper. In the words of Lady Fox, the exceptions to immunity from 
execution under the FSIA are more liberal with respect to the property of 
“agencies or instrumentalities” than to that of the foreign states.208 
Indeed, § 1610(b)(2) creates a broader exception to immunity from 
execution for the case of the “agencies or instrumentalities.” Basically, the 
nexus between the property to be executed and the commercial activity 
upon which the claim is based, which is needed in the case of the State 
proper, is not required in the case of “agencies or instrumentalities.” Thus, 
any property (whether or not used for a commercial activity)209 in the U.S. 
of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign State engaged in commercial 
activity in the U.S. shall not be immune from execution, upon a judgment 
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entered by a U.S. court, if the judgment relates to a claim for which the 
“agency or instrumentality” is not immune from jurisdiction, regardless of 
whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is 
based. 
Therefore, any property in the U.S. of a SWF that qualifies as an 
“agency or instrumentality” of a foreign State and is engaged in 
commercial activity in the U.S. shall not be immune from execution, upon 
a judgment entered by a U.S. court if the judgment relates to a claim for 
which the relevant SWF is not immune from jurisdiction, regardless of 
whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is 
based. Such SWF will not be immune from jurisdiction by virtue, for 
example, of the “commercial activity” exception under § 1605(a)(2) FSIA 
or of any other exception to immunity such as those provided under FSIA 
§ 1605(a)(3), or (5) or § 1605(b). Moreover, there will be no need of a 
nexus between the SWF property and the activity upon which the claim 
was based. 
Conversely, a pool-of-assets-SWF creditor will not be able to execute 
a judgment against funds of the pool other than those used for the activity 
upon which the relevant claim was based. This creates a differential 
treatment among creditors of SWFs that is unjustified and lacks coherence. 
No U.S. judgment dealing with a SWF qualifying as an “agency or 
instrumentality” and the exception to immunity from execution provided 
for under § 1610(b)(2) FSIA has been found. However, some U.S. 
judgments have dealt with other exceptions such as “waiver.” In that 
context, it is useful to refer once again to the Capital Trans Int’l case. As 
may be recalled, the Capital Trans Int’l court declined to hear the case on 
the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine.210 The doctrine of forum 
non conveniens will not be analyzed here. However, the dismissal of the 
Capital Trans Int’l case on that basis brought about an important element 
for the purposes of IPIC’s potential immunity from execution. 
In fact, in conducting its forum non conveniens assessment, the court 
considered that execution of a U.S. judgment issued against another 
sovereign would be uncertain, as the court could only attach properties that 
IPIC owned in the U.S. At the same time, the court took into account the 
unlikelihood of success of any attempt to enforce an adverse judgment 
against IPIC in the U.A.E.211 Thus, the court required a written stipulation 
by IPIC consenting to the domestication (i.e., recognition) and execution 
in the U.S. of any final judgment entered in the U.A.E.  Such stipulation 
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was ordered “[t]o ameliorate the problem of not receiving enforcement 
power of a judgment against IPIC in the UAE.” The case was then 
dismissed against IPIC based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.212 
The requirement of such a stipulation as a condition to dismiss the case 
on forum non conveniens is somehow equivalent to a demand that IPIC 
waives its immunity from execution in the U.S. In fact, having been 
characterized as an “instrumentality,” pursuant to § 1609 FSIA, IPIC 
would be entitled to immunity from attachment and execution. Naturally, 
IPIC would be also subject to the exceptions contemplated in § 1610, 
including the possibility of a “waiver.” Nevertheless, the abovementioned 
condition imposed on IPIC by the Capital Trans Int’l Court could cast 
doubts on the voluntariness of such a “waiver” from IPIC. That solution 
may give IPIC some ammunition to resist execution in the U.S. IPIC could, 
for example, challenge the validity of the waiver.” 
Another fairly recent U.S. case involving a SWF which dealt with its 
immunity from attachment or execution was Janvey v. Libyan Investment 
Authority (“LIA”), decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.213 The judgment referred to LIA’s immunity from attachment. The 
claimant was seeking a preliminary injunction and the court considered 
that such injunction would serve the same purpose of an attachment. For 
that reason, the court concluded that the general rule of immunity from 
attachment of property belonging to a foreign sovereign provided for 
under § 1609 FSIA would prevent it from entering a preliminary 
injunction.214 
While the purpose of the injunction sought by Janvey was likely to 
secure the satisfaction of a judgment, the court did not even get to consider 
this requisite because there had not been a “waiver” on the part of LIA.215 
It is important to bear in mind that § 1610(d) FSIA, which provides for an 
exception to immunity from attachment prior to entry of judgment, 
requires two cumulative requisites: (1) “waiver;” and (2) that the 
attachment is sought in order to secure satisfaction of a judgment. Because 
one of those requisites was not present, the court stayed its analysis and 
denied claimant’s request for an injunction. 
C. Pool-of-Assets-SWFs Managed by Central Banks or 
Monetary Authorities and Immunity from Execution 
Under the FSIA, foreign central banks or monetary authorities are 
protected by a special regime of immunity from execution. Thus, SWFs 
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that are pools of assets managed by those public financial institutions are 
covered by such regime, which in any event, applies to all central banks 
or monetary authorities of all legal forms and regardless of whether those 
central banks or monetary authorities have separate legal personality. 
As was mentioned before, there is no definition of central banks or 
monetary authorities in the FSIA. Ernest T. Patrikis, former General 
Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has stated that there is 
not a simple definition of “central bank” that readily fits all these 
institutions.216 Patrikis argues that a precise definition of a “central bank” 
is not possible because the structures and activities of central banks vary 
from country to country.217 In general, central banks have custody of, and 
administer their nation’s monetary reserves. They have authority to issue 
legal tender; control credit; or exercise supervisory powers over 
commercial banks.218 
In connection to central banks, the FSIA favors function over form.219 
Thus, they are defined by their activities more than by their legal 
structures. In applying the special regimen of immunity from execution 
consistently with that approach, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York recently stated: “[I]mmunity [under § 1611(1)(b) 
FSIA] protects central bank property regardless of the bank’s 
independence from the sovereign state.”220 Hence, when faced with issues 
of central bank or monetary authority status, U.S. courts make their 
assessment as a ratione materiae issue rather than one ratione personae. 
a. Central Banking Activities 
Where a foreign State entity alleges its status as a central bank or 
monetary authority, it has the burden of proof that it is charged with typical 
duties of central banks. In other words, the evidence will have to 
demonstrate that it conducts “central banking activities.” In this 
connection, Mr. Paul Lee’s considers that the most significant determinant 
functions of central bank status, for purposes of the FSIA, should be the 
issuance or holding of the country’s currency and precious metal 
reserves.221 
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Some U.S. court cases have dealt with the issue of “central bank” 
status in order to determine whether a foreign institution qualifies as a 
central bank or monetary authority for purposes of the FSIA. Those cases 
have been decided using the “central banking activities” criteria. In that 
connection, in NML, Capital, Ltd., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit indicated there is no definitive list of activities “normally 
understood” to be central banking functions. The court determined that the 
definition of a “central bank activity” is likely to change over time. It 
indicated that, as the NML Capital, Ltd. case shown, even in unusual 
circumstances it is not difficult to tell whether a central bank is engaged in 
a function characteristic of central banks.222 
Yet, the NML, Capital, Ltd. Court of Appeals ultimately relied on 
Ernest T. Patrikis’ enumeration of functions of central banks and 
considered them equivalent to “traditional activities of central banks.”223 
In that regard, in his 1982 paper, Patrikis had identified the following as 
central bank functions or activities: (1) issuance of notes, coins, and legal 
tender; (2) custody and administration of the nation’s monetary reserves 
through the holding of gold, silver, domestic and foreign securities, foreign 
exchange, acceptances and other credit instruments, and IMF Special 
Drawing Rights; (3) establishment and maintenance of reserves of 
depository institutions; (4) discounts and advances to depository 
institutions; (5) receipt of deposits from the government, international 
organizations, depository institutions; (6) open market operations; (7) 
credit controls; and (8) licensing, supervision, and inspection of banks.224 
In addition, Patrikis submitted that when a central bank acts as a bank 
for its parent foreign State and its agencies and instrumentalities, it 
engages in a central banking and governmental function.225 Thus, for that 
commentator, “central banking activities” appears to be an open-ended 
notion. 
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In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit took into consideration the arguments of Argentina and 
Banco Central de la República Argentina in the sense that such central 
bank was charged by statute with the power and responsibility of issuing 
and monitoring the stability of the Argentine peso, establishing and 
implementing monetary policy, and regulating the Argentine banking 
system and financial sector.226 As a result, Banco Central de la República 
Argentina was regarded as a central bank. 
In Olympic Chartering, S.A. v. Ministry of Industry and Trade, the 
same U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York took into 
account that the Central Bank of Jordan performed activities understood 
as central banking activities. In that connection, the central bank was 
responsible for maintaining monetary stability in that middle-eastern 
country; it had the sole right to issue currency; it maintained cash reserves 
collected from commercial banks and maintained the gold and foreign 
exchange reserves of the Kingdom of Jordan; and it was the banker and 
fiscal agent for the Jordanian government. Therefore, the court concluded 
that the Central Bank of Jordan was clearly a ‘foreign central bank’ for 
purposes of § 1611(b)(1) FSIA.227 
Another important case, which was decided by the same court in 2000, 
was LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua.228 This case involved 
Banco Central de Nicaragua, the central bank of Nicaragua, a government 
corporation incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Nicaragua, as 
its central bank and wholly owned by it.  It was routinely engaged in both 
governmental and private banking activities. The central bank was created 
by an enabling statute which required it to formulate and administer 
Nicaragua’s monetary policies. In order to formulate and administer 
policies, it was given the authority to print and issue currency, establish 
interest rates, purchase and sell financial instruments, and monitor 
Nicaragua’s external debt.229 
Banco Central de Nicaragua regularly facilitated monetary transfers 
and business transactions between Nicaraguan entities and entities abroad 
by opening its accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
Nicaraguan and foreign entities who then utilized the central banks’ 
accounts to make and receive payments to and from one another. Banco 
Central de Nicaragua also acted as a servicing agent to facilitate loans 
made by international creditors to Nicaraguan entities. Additionally, it 
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acted as a banker for commercial banks and other financial institutions.230 
All these activities were clearly those ordinarily conducted by central 
banks. As a result, the court did not hesitate for a moment that Banco 
Central de Nicaragua was, indeed, the central bank of that State. 
In the 1984 case of Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York took note that 
Banco de Guatemala was a bank created pursuant to the laws of 
Guatemala and was also owned by that foreign State.231 It had the 
exclusive authority in the country to issue currency, to have custody of and 
to administer the Republic of Guatemala’s monetary reserves, to engage 
in open-market transactions in Guatemalan government securities so as to 
regulate the money supply, and to act as depository for the funds of the 
Republic and its agencies.232 On that basis, the court readily considered it 
a central bank under § 1611(b)(1) FSIA. 
As was noted by Paul Lee in his thorough analysis on “central bank” 
status,233 Banque Compafina presented a clear case for central bank status 
under § 1611(b)(1).234 The functions of Banco de Guatemala covered in 
one entity many of the functions conventionally associated with central 
banks and monetary authorities.235 
From this analysis of some of the most relevant and recent U.S. cases 
in connection to central bank status under § 1611(b)(1) FSIA, it is apparent 
that what matters, for purposes of assessing central bank or monetary 
authority status, it is not so much the legal structure of the entity.  It is the 
functions that an entity claiming to be a central bank or monetary authority 
deploys what will be key for a U.S. court’s determination. Where an entity 
performs “central banking activities,” it is likely to be considered as a 
central bank or monetary authority by a U.S. court. Therefore, the notion 
of a foreign “central bank or monetary authority,” for purposes of the 
FSIA, is one that, regardless of their legal structures, covers those 
institutions that deploy central banking activities for a foreign State. 
b. The Particular Regime of Immunity from Execution 
Applicable to Central Banks 
As was previously stated, pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by central 
banks or monetary authorities are protected by the FSIA special regime of 
immunity from execution applicable to central banks or monetary 
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authorities. Those FSIA rules on immunity from execution protect foreign 
central banks or other monetary authorities in a very singular way. Indeed, 
§ 1611 FSIA provides for a regime of virtually absolute immunity from 
execution for certain State property, including property of foreign central 
banks or monetary authorities, held for their own account.236 
In that connection, subsection (b)(1) indicates that the property of a 
foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account is 
immune from execution.  Importantly, § 1611(b)(1) FSIA makes such 
property immune from execution, regardless of whether it is devoted to a 
commercial activity or not or whether the property in question is devoted 
to the activity that was the object of the dispute or not. That rule of absolute 
immunity from execution provides for an exception: where there is an 
explicit “waiver.” Also, the modern terrorism exception to immunity from 
execution under FSIA § 1610(f)(1)(A) or Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(“TRIA”) applies to central banks and monetary authorities. However, 
both exceptions are beyond the scope of this research. 
As may be seen, § 1611(b)(1) FSIA is more restrictive than the general 
rules of immunity from execution regarding property of the State proper 
or property of “agencies or instrumentalities.” Section 1611(b)(1) FSIA 
provides a highly potent protection for central bank property in the U.S.237 
That rule reflected the Congressional concern for the foreign policy 
implications that would be presented by execution in the U.S. against the 
reserves of foreign States. It also reflected a more pragmatic concern that 
the risk of execution in the absence of an explicit waiver might lead foreign 
States to withdraw their funds from the U.S.238 
Although it may seem obvious, in order for § 1611(b)(1) FSIA to play 
any role, the property sought to be attached must be that of a foreign 
central bank or monetary authority, i.e., not of any other entity or third 
party. As was pointed out by Patrikis, assets, such as securities, received 
by the central bank as a custodian and held in the U.S. by a sub-custodian 
might not be regarded as property of the central bank.239 However, when 
it comes to cash deposits, the situation is different. Hence, most cash 
deposits with banks, become their property: the amounts on deposit 
                                                                                                             
236 Patrikis, supra note 129, at 271. For an account in favor of the absolute regime of 
immunity from execution of central banks, See Note, Too Sovereign to Be Sued: Immunity 
of Central Banks in Times of Financial Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REV. 550 (2010). 
237 Tomas Baxter Jr., Speech: ‘Recent Developments in Key Legal Issues of International 
Reserves Investments,’ delivered at the Central Reserve Bank of Peru on the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act and Central Bank Immunity in the United States (Nov. 16, 2010) 
(text accompanying footnote 27). Available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2010/bax101119.html (last visited July 11, 2016). 
238 Lee, supra note 127, at 349; see also id. at n.80 (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, 
at 31 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6630). 
239 Patrikis, supra note 129, at 275. 
62 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
 
represent an indebtedness by the bank towards its client or State-entity-
depositor.240 Thus, funds composing an asset pool SWF deposited with its 
managing central bank, would in all likelihood be considered the property 
of the central bank. In addition, unless other assets composing a pool-of-
assets-SWF were held by a central bank merely in a custodian, trustee or 
agency capacity, they would, most likely, be also considered property of 
the central bank. 
In any event, a different question to ask in order to understand the 
scope of the immunity from execution that the FSIA affords to foreign 
central banks and monetary authorities is whether the property of a foreign 
central bank or monetary authority that is not held for its own account 
would be immune from execution. An interpretation a contrario of 
§ 1611(b)(1) suggests that if the property of a foreign central bank or 
monetary authority is not held for its own account, then such property 
would presumably be subject to the provisions of § 1610(b) FSIA, relating 
to post-judgment attachment and execution.241 In other words, such 
property would be attachable where the central bank qualifying as an 
“agency or instrumentality”—as most central banks will do—is engaged 
in commercial activity in the U.S. Perhaps the most important question to 
ask then, is what is the meaning of the phrase “held for its own account” 
in § 1611(b)(1) FSIA. 
c. The Meaning of the Phrase “Held for Its Own 
Account” In § 1611(b)(1) FSIA 
The key to understand the scope of the regime of immunity from 
execution of central banks and other monetary authorities under 
§ 1611(b)(1) FSIA lies on the phrase “held for its own account.” The 
problem though is that the FSIA does not contain a definition of such 
phrase.242 What that phrase means is not a simple question.243 Not only the 
FSIA does not elaborate on the meaning of that phrase but the legislative 
history of the FSIA demonstrates that Congress’ intent was to provide for 
a regime of immunity from execution for property of central banks or 
monetary authorities with a broader coverage than the plain language in 
§ 1611(b)(1) suggests. As a result, different judgments of lower courts 
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have pointed into, broadly, two different directions. Some of them have 
determined that central bank property is “held for its own account” if such 
property is used for traditional “central banking activities” and are not used 
in “commercial activities.”244 Others, have concluded that property “used 
for commercial activity” and property held by a central bank “for its own 
account” are not mutually exclusive categories. 
The first approach is based on a literal reading of a statement in the 
FSIA legislative history in connection to § 1611(b)(1). The relevant House 
Report stated: 
[§ 1611(b)(1) FSIA] applies to funds of a foreign central 
bank or monetary authority which are deposited in the 
United States and ‘held’ for the bank’s or authority’s ‘own 
account’ i.e., funds used or held in connection with central 
banking activities, as distinguished from funds used 
solely to finance the commercial transactions of other 
entities or of foreign states. If execution could be levied 
on such funds without an explicit waiver, deposit of 
foreign funds in the United States might be discouraged. 
Moreover, execution against the reserves of foreign states 
could cause significant foreign relations problems.245 
This statement may suggest a deliberate intent to distinguish between 
“central banking activities” from “commercial activities.” Thus, the 
abovementioned approach, that considers central bank property “held for 
its own account” as property used for activities normally understood to be 
the functions of central banks and not used in commercial activities, is not 
unreasonable. For example, in Banco Central de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs 
Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C., the District Court distinguished between 
property “used or held with central banking activities” from “funds used 
solely to finance the commercial transactions of other entities or of foreign 
states.” The court held that because the funds in an account of Peru’s 
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central bank were being used to guarantee loans to commercial banks, 
those were not central banking activities.246 
Even a Federal Court of Appeals (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit), in the case of Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces 
of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, seems to have 
favored that first approach.247 The court’s conclusion suggests that, as per 
the House Report, funds “held for its own account” means funds used or 
held in connection with central banking activities to the exclusion of 
“commercial activities.”248 The Court of Appeals dispatched the immunity 
argument of the Iranian Ministry of Defense on the basis that the Iranian 
Ministry could not show that the asset to be attached (a judgment 
confirming an arbitration award) was “used or held in connection with 
central banking activities.”249 
The language in the House Report regarding § 1611(b)(1) FSIA, may 
certainly reveal a confusion—deliberate or involuntary—or a treatment of 
two different activities of central banks as equivalent: to hold funds for 
their own account, on the one hand; and to conduct “central banking” 
activities, on the other. In other words, this language of the House Report 
almost reveals a conception that central banks can only properly hold 
funds if those funds are devoted to central banking activities. All other 
funds held by the central bank will be held on behalf of other entities and 
for purposes of commercial transactions. At the same time, this statement 
suggests a conception that central banks cannot hold assets for their own 
account as individual entities and for their own profit. Hence, all assets 
purportedly held by the central bank “for its own account” would be 
ultimately held to accomplish activities for the benefit of the State and 
other State entities. 
In any event, other courts have adopted a different approach. In 
Weston Compagnie de Finance et D’Investissement, S.A. v. La Republica 
del Ecuador,250 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York considered flawed the argument by plaintiff, which was formulated 
on the basis of a dichotomy between, on the one hand, the property of a 
central bank “used for commercial activity” and, on the other hand, the 
property of a central bank “held for its own account.”251 Indeed, the court 
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reasoned that property “used for commercial activity” and property held 
by a central bank “for its own account” are not mutually exclusive 
categories.252 This approach was later endorsed by the same court in 2001 
in the case of Olympic Chartering, S.A. v. Ministry of Industry and 
Trade.253 
According to the Weston Court, the structure of the FSIA makes clear 
that property of a central bank held for its own account is a category of 
property used for commercial activity.254 In that connection, it pointed that 
§ 1609 FSIA provides for a general rule of immunity of foreign States’ 
property in the U.S. while § 1610 provides for certain exceptions to such 
general rule. At the same time—concluded the Weston Court—
§ 1611(b)(1) is an exception to § 1610, providing for immunity from 
attachment that would otherwise be allowed. Section 1610, however, 
allows attachment only of property “used for a commercial activity.” 
Therefore, the property referred to in § 1611(b)(1) must be property used 
for a commercial activity.255 
At the same time, the Weston Court quoted with approval the position 
of Ernest T. Patrikis, who submits that property of a central bank is 
immune from attachment if the central bank uses such property for central 
banking functions as such functions are normally understood, irrespective 
of their commercial nature. Conversely, if an activity is to be regarded as 
commercial, as distinguished from a central bank activity, it should be an 
activity of the foreign central bank not generally regarded as a central 
banking activity.256 Patrikis considers that distinguishing between 
commercial and non-commercial property of central banks presents 
serious difficulties.257 In that sense, another commentator, Mr. Thomas 
Baxter, stated that the power of § 1611(b)(1) FSIA is that it does not 
depend on the distinction between commercial, on the one hand, and 
governmental, on the other.258 
It was not until 2011 that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in NML, Capital, Ltd. adopted the Weston approach and, with that, 
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Patrikis’ position.259 While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the 
“central banking activities test” is not without difficulty,260 it concluded 
that if certain funds are used for central banking activities or functions, as 
they are commonly understood, they must be immune from attachment, 
even if they are used for commercial purposes.261 
In any case, it is undeniable that the text of § 1611(b)(1) could have 
been clearer in addressing the scope of the intended immunity from 
execution for central banks’ property.262 “Held for its own account” is 
troublesome language.263 Apart from the abovementioned conclusions by 
certain U.S. courts, a literal reading of § 1611(b)(1), for example, may lead 
the interpreter to the conclusion that only property for which a foreign 
central bank is the beneficial owner will be covered by immunity from 
execution. Indeed, central banks routinely hold property of the State or 
other State entities. The interpreter could argue that property of the State 
or other State entities held by a central bank or monetary authority is not 
property held for its own account. Therefore, such property of the State or 
other State entities would be susceptible of execution. 
Although that interpretation could at first glance seem to be in line 
with a literal reading of § 1611(b)(1), it does not appear to arrive at logical 
results. In fact, such reading of § 1611(b)(1) would lead to the illogical 
result that creditors against a central bank would be able to collect, not 
against the assets of the very debtor central bank, but against other entities’ 
assets that happen to be in custody or possession of such central bank. 
Nevertheless, by definition, property in custody of a central bank would 
not be its own property but the property of a third party. As such, it could 
not be attached to cover the debts of the central bank. 
A somewhat similar interpretation was argued by the plaintiffs in the 
case of NML, Capital, Ltd. The court stated that: “Relying on a 
‘grammatical and syntactical construction of Section 1611(b),’ plaintiffs 
suggest a third definition of property of a central bank ‘held for its 
account’: ‘[p]roperty of a central bank is ‘held for its own account’ when 
it is held for [the central bank’s] own profit or advantage.’”264 But the 
                                                                                                             
259 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
260 Id. at 193. 
261 Id. at 194. 
262 One commentator considers that the term “held for its own account” is ambiguous. 
See Reagan Reynolds, NML Cap., Ltd., v. Banco Cent. de la Republica Arg.: The Second 
Cir. Reinforces Immunity Protection Over Foreign Cent. Banks, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 519, 523 (2011-2012). See also Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 327 (2002-2003). 
263 Patrikis, supra note 219, at 166. 
264 NML Capital, Ltd., 652 F.3d at 192. 
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Court of Appeals disagreed with that proposition.265 In a 2003 law review 
article, Mr. Paul Lee, one of the leading commentators on topic, identified 
four alternative readings of the phrase “held for its own account.”266 The 
arguments of plaintiffs in NML seem consistent with the first alternative 
identified in Lee’s article. 
Such first alternative, identified by Lee as the most natural reading of 
the phrase “held for its own account” in § 1611(b)(1) FSIA, would 
encompass only property held by or for the central bank as the beneficial 
owner. That reading would exclude from the protection of immunity from 
execution those assets held by a central bank merely as the record owner 
for the account of another party in a custodian, trustee or agency capacity. 
Bank deposits, on the other hand, become, in general terms, property of 
the bank and they are regarded as debts of the bank with the depositor. 
Thus, funds deposited with a central bank by another party would 
presumptively be deemed to be property of the central bank held for its 
own account unless the deposit were denominated as a custody, trust or 
other special deposit. 
Lee argues that a deposit made by a central bank with another bank 
would be deemed to be property of the central bank held for its own 
account unless the deposit itself were denominated as being made by the 
central bank in a custodial, trustee, or other special capacity for another 
party, e.g. the State or a State entity.267 This may be true from the depositor 
central bank’s perspective. From the receiving bank’s point of view, 
however, such deposit could be also considered as its property. Thus, 
Lee’s explanation on this issue may be a bit difficult to grasp. 
The second possible meaning of the phrase “held for its own account” 
in § 1611(b)(1) FSIA identified by Lee, gives a liberal reading to the 
language in the House Report relating to “central banking activities.” 
Under that reading, § 1611(b)(1) would provide immunity from execution 
for any central bank property used for the account of the central bank or 
indirectly for the account of its parent State or any agency or 
instrumentality.268 According to Lee, this second interpretation, would 
protect central bank funds used for any activities of the foreign State and 
its other agencies and instrumentalities albeit it would arguably conflict 
with the language of the House Report that excludes from protection 
“funds used solely to finance the commercial activities of other entities or 
of foreign states.”269 
                                                                                                             
265 Id. 
266 Lee, supra note 127, at 377-82. 
267 Id. at 377. 
268 Id. at 381. 
269 Id. at 382. 
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It appears as though this second option proposed by Lee is in line with 
that of Ernest Patrikis, who submits that property of a central bank is 
immune from attachment if the central bank uses such property for central 
banking functions irrespective of their commercial nature.270 Lee argues 
that this reading does not wholly comport with the language of the House 
Report,271 which appears to make a distinction between funds of a foreign 
central bank “held” for the bank’s “own account” and funds used solely to 
finance commercial transactions.272 
Importantly, the House Report refers to funds used solely to finance 
the commercial transactions.273 Thus, Patrikis’ position may not be so 
much in contradiction with the language of the House Report. In fact, 
Patrikis may be referring to property of a central bank, which is used for a 
central banking function which is, at the same time, a commercial one. 
However, if the property is used solely for commercial transactions, i.e., 
not for central banking activities, then it should not be covered by 
immunity from execution under § 1611(b)(1) FSIA. 
Lee’s third interpretation, relies on the House Report language relating 
to funds used for “commercial transactions of other entities or of foreign 
states.” Under this reading, § 1611(b)(1) would provide immunity to 
central bank property used for the account of the central bank or for a 
public or governmental activity of the foreign State or its “agencies or 
instrumentalities,” but not for commercial transactions of a foreign State 
or its “agencies or instrumentalities.”274 This third interpretation would 
leave unprotected those funds used to finance commercial transactions of 
other public entities.275 
                                                                                                             
270 Patrikis, supra note 129, at 277. 
271 Lee, supra note 127, at 380. 
272 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6630. As 
was observed in Texas Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, “[t]he House 
and Senate Committees filed identical reports, and references [herein] to the House Report 
may be deemed to represent the views of the Senate Committee as well.” Tex. Trading & 
Mill Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306 n.18 (2d Cir. 1981), overruled 
on other grounds by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer. Repub., 582 F.3d 
393 (2d Cir. 2009). (See NML Capital, Ltd. v Banco Central de la República Argentina, 
652 F.3d 172 n.18 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
273 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6630. 
As was observed in Texas Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, “[t]he 
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Report may be deemed to represent the views of the Senate Committee as well.” 647 F.2d 
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State Oil Co. of Azer. Repub., 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir.2009). (See NML Capital, Ltd. v Banco 
Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 n.18 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
274 Lee, supra note 127, at 381. 
275 Id. at 382. 
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The fourth interpretation, which relies on the commercial activity 
exception to limit the meaning of “central banking activities,” would 
provide protection only for property of the central bank used for a public 
or governmental activity and not for property used for “commercial 
transactions” for the account of the central bank.276 This interpretation 
construes the language of the House Report relating to “central banking 
activities” to mean those that are governmental in nature.277 The judgments 
in the cases of Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l (Overseas) Ltd. v. State 
Bank of Pakistan; Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala; Banco 
Central de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. and 
even Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems adopted certain approaches that pivot 
around Lee’s third and fourth approaches. 
In any case, among these four alternatives, the Second Circuit in NML, 
Capital, Ltd. favored the second approach which was the one proposed by 
Ernest Patrikis. Indeed, more than ten years earlier than Lee, Patrikis had 
stated that the property of a central bank is immune from attachment if the 
central bank uses such property for central banking functions as such 
functions are normally understood, irrespective of their commercial 
nature. Conversely, if the property is used for commercial, as opposed to 
central banking, purposes, then it is not immune.278 Put differently, if an 
activity is to be regarded as commercial, as distinguished from a central 
bank activity, it should be an activity of the foreign central bank not 
generally regarded as a central banking activity.279 This approach was 
endorsed in 2011 by the NML, Capital, Ltd. judgment.280 A key issue in 
any case involving the attachment of foreign central bank assets, therefore, 
is whether the property is used in a central banking or a non-central 
banking activity.281 
The NML, Capital, Ltd. court indicated that the structure of the FSIA 
suggests that property used for commercial activity and property of a 
central bank held for its own account are not mutually exclusive 
categories, because some property of a central bank held for its own 
account is a category of property used for commercial activity.282 Thus, a 
showing that property of a central bank is used for a commercial activity 
                                                                                                             
276 Id. at 381; see also Note: Too Sovereign to Be Sued: Immunity of Central Banks in 
Times of Financial Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REV. 550, 564 (2010). 
277 Lee, supra note 127, at 382. 
278 See Patrikis, supra note 129, at 277. 
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70 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
 
does not, of itself, exclude it from the immunity granted by 
§ 1611(b)(1).283 
According to two more contemporaneous commentators, the phrase 
“held for its own account” is intended and taken to mean that the funds 
“are used for central bank functions as these are normally understood,” 
even if this means that they are “used for commercial purposes.”284 This 
approach is consistent with that of Mr. Ernest T. Patrikis discussed above 
and, ultimately, with the 2011 NML, Capital, Ltd. judgment also discussed 
above. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet acknowledged its agreement 
with this approach, but it is fair to say that this is the prevailing approach 
at present. 
As a result, whether the funds or assets composing a SWF are 
considered held for the central bank’s own account would depend on 
whether managing those funds, i.e., investing the pool-of-assets-SWF is 
considered as a “central banking activity.” Indeed, on the basis of the 2011 
NML, Capital, Ltd. judgment, one may wonder whether the management 
of a pool-of-assets-SWF by a central bank would be considered as a 
“central banking activity.” That would ultimately depend on the relevant 
court’s appreciation. Only if the court determines that management of a 
pool-of-assets-SWF is not a “central banking activity,” they would be 
considered not to be held for the central bank’s own account. In that case, 
the funds or assets composing the SWF will not be covered by immunity 
from execution. 
At this juncture, it is interesting to refer to an editorial “Note” 
published in the 2010 Harvard Law Review, i.e., prior to the Second 
Circuit judgment in NML, Capital, Ltd. Such Note advocated for a 
stringent regime of immunity concerning central banks and proposed a 
reading of the phrase “held for its own account” in FSIA § 1611(b)(1) that 
made such phrase mean “used for sovereign purposes.”285 Under that 
reading, property of a central bank shall be immune from enforcement if 
it is “used for a sovereign purpose.” 
The “Note” indicates that courts should investigate the “purpose” for 
which a transaction occur.286 If that purpose-driven test shows that the 
central bank assets are used for a sovereign activity, they would be 
immune from execution. The “Note” proposes that courts should take the 
view that property of a foreign central bank is not commercial in nature, 
                                                                                                             
283 Id. at 194. 
284 Chester Brown and Roger O’Keefe, Article 21, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES & THEIR PROPERTY, A COMMENTARY 334, 343 
(Philip Alston and Vaughan Lowe eds., Oxford University Press, 2013). 
285 Note, Too Sovereign to Be Sued: Immunity of Central Banks in Times of Financial 
Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REV. 550, 568 (2010). 
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2016-2017] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY & SWFS 71 
 
at least when the property is used for central banking functions.287 This is 
not in contradiction with Patrikis’ position, as endorsed by the NML, 
Capital, Ltd. Court of Appeals. 
At first glance, it may seem as though the “Note” proposed a reading 
of § 1611(b)(1) FSIA that departed from the text of the statute. However, 
a closer look reveals that what the “Note” submits is that “central banking 
activities,” as stated in the House Report,288 are “sovereign activities.” At 
least the practical outcome of the Note’s proposal would make the notion 
of “central banking activities”—in the NML, Capital, Ltd. judgment 
terms—equivalent to “sovereign activities.” As a result, in order to 
determine whether certain property of a central bank shall be immune, it 
may be of good use to conduct a “purposes” test. That would be: if the 
purpose of the activity to which the property were used for were sovereign, 
then such property shall be immune. In that hypothesis, the determination 
of whether property of a central bank is “held for its own account,” would 
be a purpose-driven one. 
An a contrario interpretation of the Note’s proposal could lead to the 
preliminary conclusion that if the property of the central bank were not 
used for a sovereign activity, it would not qualify for immunity. That is 
perhaps too farfetched, in particular, if the language in the House Report 
is taken into account, where it indicates that: “[i]f execution could be 
levied on [central banks’] funds without an explicit waiver, deposit of 
foreign funds in the United States might be discouraged   . . .   caus[ing] 
significant foreign relations problems.”289 In other words, that result would 
seem to contradict the Congressional policy behind § 1611(b)(1) FSIA. 
Thus, there could be “central banking activities” that are not “sovereign 
activities.” 
Lastly, it is convenient to mention that the “Note” heavily criticizes 
the application to central banks of the “commercial activity exception” to 
immunity, which, as per Weltover, emphasizes the transaction’s nature to 
the exclusion of its purpose.290 Nevertheless, the “Note” fails to recognize 
that Weltover was a case that only dealt with immunity from jurisdiction, 
i.e., not immunity from execution. The Note’s critics are mostly based on 
the separate protections that Congress afforded to central banks. The 
reality, though, is that the FSIA certainly afforded extra protections to 
central banks but only in connection to the regime of immunity from 
execution. The regime of immunity from jurisdiction applicable to central 
                                                                                                             
287 Id.; see also Patrikis, supra note 129. 
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banks is the same regime that would apply to the State proper as well as to 
its “agencies or instrumentalities.” 
Having in mind the “Note,” in the context of asset-pool SWFs 
managed by central banks, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York judgment in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank,291 may shed some light. Banco Nacional de Cuba acted as agent for 
a Currency Stabilization Fund created by law and had the power to make 
loans to such fund as well as the purpose to assist the Currency 
Stabilization Fund in the exercise of its duty to protect the national 
currency in international trade.292 The judgment suggests that these were 
governmental functions.293 
A central bank could, for example, have the funds of the pool-of-
assets-SWF that it manages, deposited in banks in the U.S. Should a 
creditor seek to attach those funds, the central bank might argue that 
management of a SWF is as a “sovereign activity.” If the court follows 
Banco Nacional de Cuba, and considers that managing a SWF is a 
governmental or sovereign activity, it will conclude that the funds 
composing the pool-of-assets-SWF are considered to be held by the central 
bank “for its own account” and are, therefore, immune from execution. 
This conclusion would be in line with Patrikis, who argues inter alia, that 
no other activities of a sovereign are more inherently characteristic of 
sovereignty than the custody and management of a country’s financial 
reserves, regardless of the sources of the financial assets comprising those 
reserves.294 Thus, Patrikis’ conclusions would seem to be relevant, in 
particular, in the case of a SWF composed of excess reserves. 
One could think that, if a court concludes that the management of a 
SWF is not a sovereign activity, the funds or assets would then be exposed 
to execution by the creditor seeking to execute a judgment against those 
funds or assets. However, that would not be in line with the Congressional 
policy behind § 1611(b)(1) FSIA. Indeed, even if not a sovereign activity, 
managing the SWF could still be a central banking activity. As such, the 
funds and assets composing the SWF would be covered by immunity from 
execution. 
                                                                                                             
291 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 
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293 Banco Nacional de Cuba, 505 F. Supp. at 421. 
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III. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: DEPENDING ON THEIR STATUS, 
THERE WILL BE DIVERGENT IMMUNITY OUTCOMES FOR SWFS 
The rules of immunity from jurisdiction to be applied in all cases and 
to all types of State entities are the same. They will be uniformly applied 
to the State proper, to “agencies or instrumentalities,” to central banks or 
monetary authorities and even to SWFs not protected by sovereign 
immunity. Naturally, the immunity from jurisdiction recipient (or non-
recipient) will vary depending on the relevant legal structure. 
If a pool-of-assets-SWF is managed by a ministry of finance, the 
regime of sovereign immunity that will come to play will be the one 
applicable to the State proper. That is, the SWF (or rather the State) will, 
in all cases, be immune from jurisdiction, subject to the relevant 
exceptions. The most important exception, for purposes of this article, is 
the “commercial activity” exception. There are three possible 
“commercial activity” scenarios that could allow the applicability of the 
“commercial activity” exception to immunity from jurisdiction. Where the 
pool-of-assets-SWF is engaged in any of the three “commercial activity” 
scenarios, the “commercial activity” exception to immunity from 
jurisdiction would operate and U.S. courts will have jurisdiction to hear 
the case. In all these cases, the commercial character of the SWF activity 
will be determined by reference to the “nature” of the particular financial 
transaction, activity or act rather than by reference to its “purpose.” 
SWFs with separate legal personality, will enjoy the immunity from 
jurisdiction that the FSIA affords to foreign states, as long as those SWFs 
may be characterized as “agencies or instrumentalities.” At the same time, 
a SWFs with separate legal personality that does not qualify for “agency 
or instrumentality” status, will not be covered by the regimes of sovereign 
immunity provided for under the FSIA. In other words, not all SWFs with 
separate legal personality will automatically enjoy sovereign immunity 
from jurisdiction under the U.S. legal system. This lack of consistency 
under U.S. law, results in unequal treatment of SWFs which generates 
injustice for the very SWFs, their contractual partners and their creditors. 
In order to be characterized as an “agency or instrumentality,” a SWF 
with separate legal personality needs to be registered or created under the 
laws of its parent State and, either qualify as an “organ” or a majority of 
its shares must be directly owned by the State. Should a majority shares of 
a SWFs with separate legal personality be directly owned by the State, it 
will automatically be considered as an “agency or instrumentality” and 
will qualify for immunity from jurisdiction, subject to the relevant 
exceptions. Moreover, a SWF with separate legal personality which is not 
directly held by the State, or which a majority of its shares is not owned 
by the State, will not be considered as an “agency or instrumentality” 
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under the “majority ownership” prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA. The 
“majority and direct ownership” requirement makes the grant of immunity 
from jurisdiction depend upon the position of a SWF in the State chain of 
ownership. This requirement creates contradictory results which do not 
follow any logic and generates unequal treatment among SWFs, their 
contractual counterparties and creditors. 
Yet, even if a SWF fails to qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” 
under the ownership (or second) prong, it may still qualify for sovereign 
immunity if it can establish that it is an “organ” of a foreign State or a 
political subdivision thereof (first prong of § 1603(b)(2) FSIA). A SWF 
may qualify as an “organ” as long as it engages in a public activity on 
behalf of a foreign government, i.e., its purpose is one of public interest. 
Whether a SWF qualifies as an “organ” will be determined through certain 
judicial tests. The “purpose-of-the-entity” test may have certain bearing 
on that “organ” determination. The “organ” criteria do not balance out the 
inequalities generated by the “direct ownership” requirement. At the same 
time, such “organ” criteria also has its own potential to generate unequal 
treatment among SWFs, their contractual counterparties and creditors. 
On the other hand, in the case of pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by 
central banks or monetary authorities, they will be subject to the regime of 
immunity from jurisdiction applicable to the State and its “agencies or 
instrumentalities.” Although a pool-of-assets-SWF managed by a central 
bank can get involved in a legal dispute against it, technically, the 
defendant would not be the very asset-pool SWF. This type of SWFs do 
not have separate legal personality. As a result, the claimant would have 
to name the managing central bank (or the State if the central bank does 
no ta have separate legal personality) as defendant. The regime of 
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction would apply in the same way 
regardless of which State entity is the defendant. 
FSIA § 1609 contains a general rule of immunity of the property of a 
foreign State from attachment and execution in the U.S. Yet, depending 
on the status of a SWF as a pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by the State, an 
“agency or instrumentality” or a pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a 
central bank, the outcomes will be divergent. 
A creditor may execute a judgment against the funds of a pool-of-
assets-SWF managed by the State, used for a commercial activity in the 
U.S., as long as such creditor can establish that those funds were used in 
the very commercial activity that was the basis of the dispute that resulted 
in the judgment sought to be executed. In other words, in order for the 
“commercial activity” exception to the rules of immunity from execution 
play a role, it is necessary to establish a “nexus” between the property to 
be executed and the commercial activity upon which the claim has been 
based. 
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Any property in the U.S. of a SWF that qualifies as an “agency or 
instrumentality” of a foreign State and is engaged in commercial activity 
in the U.S. shall not be immune from execution, upon a judgment entered 
by a U.S. court if the judgment relates to a claim for which the relevant 
SWF is not immune from jurisdiction. In other words, the exceptions to 
the rules of immunity from execution may apply to SWFs that are 
considered “agencies or instrumentalities,” without the need to establish a 
“nexus” between the property to be executed and the commercial activity 
upon which the claim has been based. The need of such a “nexus” between 
property and activity in the case of SWFs without separate legal 
personality managed by the State proper and the lack thereof in the case 
of “agencies or instrumentalities,” is the most salient difference between 
the situation of those two types of SWFs. In addition, SWFs with separate 
legal personality that do not qualify as “agencies or instrumentalities” will 
not be covered by immunity from execution at all under the FSIA. Those 
differential treatments raise inequalities between the relevant stakeholders. 
However, the assets of a pool-of-assets-SWFs managed by a central 
bank will be subject to the special regime of immunity from execution 
applicable to central banks or monetary authorities, as long as they are 
considered to be the property of any of those official financial institutions 
and are held by them for “central banking purposes.” Only those funds or 
assets composing a pool-of-assets-SWF that are held by a central bank, not 
in a custodian, trustee or agency capacity, will be considered property of 
the central bank. 
Moreover, the special regime of immunity from execution applicable 
to central banks and monetary authorities will cover the assets of a pool-
of-assets-SWF managed by a central bank, solely if the relevant U.S. court 
considers that management of the SWF is a “central banking activity.” 
Only if the court determines that management of a pool-of-assets-SWF is 
not a “central banking activity,” it will be considered that the funds or 
assets composing the pool-of-assets-SWF managed by a central bank are 
not held for the central bank’s own account. Accordingly, the regime of 
sovereign immunity from execution regarding central banks will not 
apply. In practice, this possibility is rather remote. Yet, the case will be 
akin to that of an “agency or instrumentality” with all accruing 
consequences. This somehow “activity-based” approach of the FSIA 
regarding SWFs managed by central banks is preferable than a rule of 
absolute immunity of central banks. Yet, it is not fully satisfactory because 
it does not provide consistency in the treatment of SWFs. 
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Fund 
Nigeria  Nigerian Sovereign Investment  
Authority 
Nigeria (Bayelsa) Bayelsa Development  
Investment Corporation 
Norway  Government Pension Fund –  
Global 
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  
 Oman Investment Fund 
Palestine  Palestine Investment Fund 
Panama  Fondo de Ahorro de Panamá 
Papua New Guinea  Papua New Guinea Sovereign  
Wealth Fund 
Peru  Fiscal Stabilization Fund 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority 
Russia  National Welfare Fund 
 Russian Direct Investment Fund  
 Reserve Fund 
Senegal  Senegal FONSIS 
Singapore  Government of Singapore  
Investment Corporation 
 Temasek Holdings 
Saudi Arabia  SAMA Foreign Holdings 
 Public Investment Fund 
South Korea  Korea Investment Corporation 
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund 
Turkmenistan  Turkmenistan Stabilization  
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Fund 
United Arab Emirates  
(Federal) 
Emirates Investment Authority 
United Arab Emirates  
(Abu Dhabi)  
Abu Dhabi Investment  
Authority (ADIA) 
 International Petroleum  
Investment Company 
 Mubadala Development  
Company 
 Abu Dhabi Investment Council 
United Arab Emirates  
(Dubai) 
Investment Corporation of  
Dubai 
United Arab Emirates  
(Ras Al Khaimah) 
RAK Investment Authority 
USA (Alabama)  Alabama Trust Fund 
USA (Alaska) Alaska Permanent Fund 
USA (Louisiana) Louisiana Education Quality  
Trust Fund 
USA (New Mexico) New Mexico State Investment  
Council 
USA (North Dakota) North Dakota Legacy Fund 
USA (Texas) Texas Permanent School Fund 
USA (Texas) Texas Permanent University  
Fund  
USA (Wyoming) Permanent Wyoming Mineral  
Trust Fund 
USA (West Virginia) West Virginia Future Fund 
Vietnam  State Capital Investment  
Corporation 
Venezuela  FIEM 
 
